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This paper considers the external validity of the growing set of literature that uses laboratory auctions 
to reveal consumers’ willingness to pay for consumer goods, when the concerned goods are sold in 
retailing shops through posted price procedures. Here, the quality of the parallel between the field and 
the lab crucially depends on whether being informed of the actual field price influences a consumer’s 
willingness to pay for a good or not. We show that the elasticity of the WTP revision according to the 
field price estimation error is significant, positive, and can be roughly approximate to one quarter of 
the error. We then discuss the normative implications of these results for future experiments aimed at 
eliciting private valuations through auctions.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the seminal paper of Hoffman et al. (1993), auction selling procedures in laboratories have 
appeared as an appealing and challenging method for eliciting consumer preferences in applied 
studies. These new experimental methods tend to complement or even to substitute traditional surveys 
and questionnaires used for decades in marketing studies. They have been employed extensively for 
various purposes in applied economics (for a detailed survey, see Lusk and Shogren, 2007). Domains 
of application include product marketing (demand-led conception, packaging, pricing, etc.) and public 
regulation (labelling control, innovation acceptability, etc.). Numerous applications are found in the 
food industry, due to the complexity of the products, their attributes and labelling.  Previous studies 
have covered desirable characteristics – e.g. food safety (e.g. Buzby et al., 1998, Hayes et al., 1995) 
and animal welfare (Lusk and Norwood, 2008) –, less desirable ones – e.g. GMOs (Lusk et al., 2001, 
Noussair et al., 2004), hormones (Fox, 1995) and insecticides (Roosen et al., 1998) and, lastly, 
intrinsic or extrinsic characteristics – from countless studies on taste to fair-trade (Rousu and Corrigan, 
2008) –. The products or characteristic concerned might be available on the actual field consumer 
market (Wertenbroch and Skiera, 2002) or not (List, 2003). 
The large success of these experimental methods in applied research stems primarily from the fact that 
participants have real incentives for revealing the true value that they attribute to a product, contrary to 
hypothetical survey settings (among others, see Cummings et al., 1995; List and Shogren, 1998, and 
Neill et al., 1994). Another advantage of using experimental methods is that their results are expressed 
in money units, more useful for most users than hedonic marks or mere product ranking. In order to 
support this experimental method as a valuable tool in market research, the reliability of its estimates 
must be assessed, especially when they produce out-of-the-lab predictions. 
Preferences measured in the laboratory are defined in monetary terms by values, a value being the 
maximum amount that each bidder (buyer) is willing to pay.  Value is built by the buyer-consumer, 
and therefore known by her. Conversely, this value is ignored by the seller (here the experimentalist). 
The use of incentive-compatible auctions (Vickrey, 1961) or equivalent selling procedures such as 
BDM (Becker et al., 1964) for eliciting WTP (i.e. bid=WTP) has been validated scientifically in the 
best literature, both theoretically (Vickrey, 1961) and empirically, thanks to the ‘induced-value’ 
methodology introduced by Vernon Smith (1976). Reassured by these results based on redemption 
values of lab products, we can now legitimately use these procedures to elicit homegrown values for 
real life products, with the hypothesis: bid=WTP=home-grown value
2. Subsequent literature specifies 
precise technical conditions in the lab for this hypothesis to be sustainable: proper incentives, adequate 
learning procedures and explanations (List and Shogren, 1998), private information (to avoid 
affiliation, Corrigan and Rousu, 2006), n products for sale depending on the number of participants 
with Vickrey, etc.
3 In the present article we assume that this hypothesis holds, i.e. that bid=WTP, and 
focus on the content of this WTP. 
                                                      
2 Note that the expression ‘homegrown value’ qualifies the product, and not any behavior or preference. 
3 Nevertheless, theoretically equivalent procedures had been shown to have different degrees of efficiency in 
reveling redemption values in the lab. For instance, Noussair et al. (2004b) even observe significant differences 
between WTP in BDM procedures and WTP in Vickrey auctions. In this article we question the parallel between a revealed ‘in-the-lab’ WTP and an ignored ‘out-of-the-
lab’ WTP. Although Brookshire et al. (1987) could not find any significant difference between the 
‘real world’ and the lab for privately consumed commodities, various hindrances were identified as 
limiting the quality of the parallel between the lab and the field, i.e. the external validity of the 
method. In particular, we concentrate here on one (important) dimension of this problem: the price 
effect. In the field, at least in developed countries, most consumer goods are sold with posted price 
procedures. In the laboratory, we use auctions or BDM procedures. The external validity of such 
laboratory experiments may be limited, for two related reasons. First, the in- and out-of-the-lab selling 
procedures involve different decision processes (‘take it or leave it’ in the field, and ‘make a bid’ in 
the lab). By comparing posted prices and bilateral bargaining market institutions, Cason et al. (2003) 
show that the choice of the selling procedure influences outcomes. Second, there is another difference: 
the presence (in the field) or absence (in the lab) of a visible Field Price (FP) when taking a buying 
decision. The fact of the buyer knowing or ignoring the FP will pose a problem of parallelism if (and 
only if) WTP is dependent on the FP. In this case, the WTP in the lab (WTPlab) may differ from WTP 
in the field (WTPfield), and a bias may be introduced by the lab procedure
4. Note that if WTP depends 
on the field price, two distinct issues come up. One is parallelism. The other, of a much more general 
purpose, is the issue of the stability of WTPfield as it may depend on field price. If it does, various field 
prices (due to price discrimination, promotion, taxes or subsidies), may lead to various WTPfield. In 
developing countries, where prices are often defined with bilateral negotiation, the issue is even 
bigger. In this paper we concentrate on the question of parallelism, but we see that we cannot answer 
this question properly without keeping an eye on the issue of WTP in the field.  
The question of the (in)dependence of WTP from FP has already been addressed in the literature. 
Cherry et al. (2004) show with induced value that outsides options shave bids. Harrison et al. (2004) 
revisit the data of Hoffman et al. (1993) by estimating a random effects Tobit model with lower and 
upper limits. They reach the conclusion that ignoring the censoring of elicited values due to extra-
laboratory prices can significantly alter the results. Using a choice experiment, Carlsson et al. (2007) 
show that preferences are affected by the inclusion of a price. Recently, Drichoutis et al. (2008) used 
the procedure of Harrison et al. (2007) to show that subjects provided with reference price information 
bid on average €0.21 more for a sandwich than those who are not. To explain such results, Harrison et 
al. (2004) stress the importance of belief and knowledge of both price-tags and of the product 
characteristics. But the aforementioned experimental procedures do not include means to measure such 
beliefs.  
We propose a new protocol including three new variables in a well-controlled ‘within’ procedure. For 
each 128 subjects and for each of the 8 products for sale, we elicit the field price estimation (FPestim), 
parallel with the WTP (WTPstand). We then deliver – in a highly credible way – the actual FP of the 
product, and then re-measure WTP given this price (WTPFP). With such a protocol we are in a 
controlled environment for the first time, able to observe the actual impact of the price on WTP, 
knowing the actual information given to the subject when he discovers the field price, i.e. the distance 
between initial belief and the actual price. This ‘before-after’ procedure, using only auctions, appears 
to be most accurate one for our purpose. Posted-price vs. auction would come up against the poor 
information revealed by posted-price procedures in the lab. This is precisely why we opt for auctions! 
Of course, the potential influence, on WTP, of being informed of the FP depends on how much the 
                                                      
4 In their experiment, Issanchou et al. (2008) present the participant of a choice experiment at a baker with 
several price sets for different kinds of breads. WTP obtained are then compared to WTP elicited in the lab 
through BDM. While such protocols afford much insight on the effect that the selling procedure itself may have 
on WTP, the use of fictitious prices eliminates the effect of the price information on WTP. consumer actually learns from the FP disclosure. A subject who accurately approximated a FP would 
not change much when she disclosed that she was right (neglecting risk aversion). In our protocol, we 
are able to observe (a) WTP with and without the FP information and (b) what the bidder actually 
learns from the FP disclosure (the magnitude of her over- or underestimation). 
The ideal condition of validity would be independence and then the stability of the WTP, whether FP 
is known or not, and under- or overestimated or not. If, on the contrary, the WTP for a good is largely 
influenced by FP disclosure, the use of auction procedures in the lab would appear to exclude an 
important field variable. Theoretically, we propose to confront our results with four alternative 
hypotheses: H1. Stable WTP (WTP is independent from price). H2. Price capped WTP (WTP is stable 
up to a cap given by the price and transaction costs). H3. Arbitrage WTP (WTP is determined by ‘out-
of-the-lab’ reselling and buying prices).  H4. Price signalled WTP (WTP is influenced by the price, 
used as a signal for quality). Unlike strictly controlled laboratory redemption-value products, we 
know, since Adam Smith
5, that home-grown values for not purely financial products have a double 
face value: use value and exchange value. This double face of value may exist in and out of the lab. In 
his reference textbook on auction theory, Krishna (2010) distinguishes between cases when the value 
of the auctioned good is derived from its sole consumption or use, and situations where the value of 
the auctioned good is based on how much it will fetch in the resale market. In the first context, values 
are heterogeneous among subjects and are independent on others’ behaviours. Bids then reflect strictly 
private values. In the second set of situations, values are homogeneous among subjects and bids reflect 
common values or interdependent values (see Krishna, 2010, for developments). A typical case of 
value ambivalence might be a vintage bottle of wine that the owner may either drink or resell (e.g. on 
E-Bay). Questioning your own WTP for such a bottle, you would consider both alternatives. H1 and H3 
stand for these two extreme situations. In H1, a subject may regard a good only for her personal or 
private consumption, namely for its use value. This would be for example if the buyer were forced to 
drink the bottle of wine, in or out of the lab. A current assumption in economics textbooks is that 
individuals have well-defined preferences. In this case, the elicited preferences for individual attributes 
should be independent of the price, revealed or not. FP has no effect on WTP. However, FP may still 
be useful and influence the subject’s WTP for private valuation, as it may be used as a signal of the 
quality of the good (H4). Here, we may posit that the more ignorant the subject is concerning the 
quality of the good, and simultaneously the more confident she is about the efficiency of the market 
and the similitude of her taste compared to other buyers’ tastes, the more her WTP is likely to be 
influenced by the FP disclosure.
6 However, in such situations the laboratory reveals private values. In 
H3, the subject regards a good for sale in the lab only as an exchange value. For such a subject, the FP 
therefore entirely determines the value
7. FP defines the common value and covers up private values. 
H2 corresponds to an intermediate situation. Subjects may regard the good auctioned as private value 
but would never bid more in the laboratory than the price they know or suppose they could buy the 
                                                      
5 “The word value, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility of some 
particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object 
conveys. The one may be called 'value in use;' the other, 'value in exchange.' The things which have the greatest 
value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange; and on the contrary, those which have the greatest 
value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than water: but it will 
purchase scarce anything; scarce anything can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce 
any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it.” (Wealth of 
Nations Book 1, chapter IV). In Capital I, K. Marx, following A. Smith, develops the analysis of the relation 
between exchange value and use value. 
6 A step further in the same direction would be to agree that, for certain consumers at least, the FP could be a 
valuable attribute as such. For such consumers, adjusting their WTP to the FP may be regarded as automatic.   
7 WTP=FP when one overlooks transaction costs, risk aversion and commitment costs (see Zhao and Kling, 
2004, for a definition of commitment costs) same product for in the field (here ignoring transaction costs). A subject will therefore not buy a good 
in the laboratory at a price superior to the objective or subjective field price. Harrison et al. (2004) 
refer to this as field-price censoring. In this case, the laboratory only partially reveals private values. 
Our results show that H1 and H3 are rejected. We also show that H2 alone does not exhaust the data. H4 
appears as a good candidate for explaining the residue. In our discussion, we support the idea that the 
lab reveals WTP close to field WTP, but that in and out of the lab WTPs are under posted price 
influence. We then conclude that, in experimental design aimed at measuring WTP for marketed 
products, FP might be introduced every time it is available and not a treatment variable. We also 
propose a systematic exploration of FP estimation when no actual field price is available, and/or 
pricing is at stake. Of course, one may reasonably accept the fact that, for a typical consumer, an 
offered good in the lab has both an exchange value and a use value, and therefore that these two lines 
of reasoning apply at the same time, more or less depending on the type of good supplied.  
Section (2) of this paper now presents our experimental design in more detail, with the subjects and 
indicators that will serve our analysis. Sections 3 and 4 then present the hypothesis and the results. 
After a brief discussion in Section 5, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
Our experimental design is based on three main principles: 
 (i)  WTPs are elicited through auctions. Although consumers scarcely purchase goods through 
auctions, such procedures remain the most relevant for measuring individual WTP in labs. In the lab 
posted-price sales are realistic but provide poor results, as consumers choose only yes or no for a given 
good at a given price. Therefore, the researcher may multiply the number of sales by implementing 
several artificial prices. By doing so, buyers lose the information conveyed by an actual field price. 
 (ii)  The effect of FP on WTPs is examined by observing bids before and after the introduction 
of price tags. The second idea is that the main difference between posted-price sales and auctions is 
the knowledge of the price tag. Whereas price tags may operate as a benchmark in posted-price sales, 
buyers may be unaware of them in auctions. To be successful, one must be credible when providing 
the price tags. 
 (iii)  Beliefs relative to out-of-the-lab price tags are examined. The third idea is that the 
observation of the WTP revisions is not enough. These beliefs may have an impact on the WTP 
revision when the price tag is introduced. In other words, consumers may react differently to the price 
introduction, whether they under- or overestimate it. The price disclosure may come as a bad or a good 
surprise and thus impact preferences in positively or negatively. The magnitude of this impact could 
moreover be expected to be correlated with the distance (positive or negative) between the field price 
and field price estimation. 
 
A.  Procedure and variables  
Table 1 below describes the sequence of the experiment. ---TABLE 1 HERE--- 
Each stage 1, 3 and 5 consists of 8 simultaneous 4
th price Vickrey auctions. 8 different products are 
being sold simultaneously on these auctions. In each auction at each stage, 3 items of the same product 
are being sold to the 3 highest bidders. The price is defined by the 4
th highest bid. During each of these 
stages 1, 3 and 5, the task of each subject is to place 8 bids for the 8 different products for sale 
(detailed below).  
Not every auction ends up with an effective sale. In order to avoid endowment and substitution effects, 
each subject knows that he/she will not end up purchasing more than two items
8. Bids are anonymous 
and computerized
9. No information on bids and prices was given to the subjects during the 
experiment.  
Before Stage 1, subjects participated in two practice auctions. One melon
10 and 3 soda cans were sold 
respectively at the 2
nd and 4
th bid in a Vickrey auction. At the end of each learning auction, the 
researchers discussed the winner(s) and the auction price with the audience. The winners then had to 
pay for the product they had won. This learning stage ensured a sound understanding of the sale 
procedure and of the non-hypothetical nature of the situation. 
The Stage 1 auction repeated the usual standard procedure used in experiments aimed at revealing 
WTP for real products. We call this first measure the standard willingness to pay (WTPstand). During 
Stage 2, the participants were asked to estimate the field price (FPestim). For each of the 8 products, 
they were encouraged to take this task seriously: the subject with the best estimation received €3. The 
second and the third best estimators received respectively €1 and €0.5. Stage 3 was technical. It was 
designed to check the stability of individual preferences for a product. In practical terms, it was a strict 
repetition of Stage 1. Without any additional information, subjects could reconsider their Stage 1 bids 
after guessing the FP (we call the bids collected at Stage 3 the WTP reconsidered or WTPrecon). In 
Stage 4, the actual field prices (FP) of the 8 products were disclosed to the subjects. In order to make 
this information on FP as credible as possible, we presented photographs of the products in situ, i.e. on 
shelves with clearly visible price tags. The place and date where the 8 products where originally 
bought by the researcher were also specified. Finally, in Stage 5, subjects made a last series of 8 bids 
for the 8 products, being informed of the FP. We call the data collected at this stage WTP revision 
knowing FP, or WTPFP. At the end of the experiment, one subject was asked to randomly select the 
auction stage (1, 3 or 5) that would be made effective for the purchases. 
 
B.  Indicators 
It is useful to define a series of indicators based on our collected data.  
1. WTP revision induced by the FP disclosure. ΔWTPrevis = WTPFP – WTPstand () 
ΔWTPrevis  measures the extent to which a subject revises her WTP for a given product once the 
researcher has disclosed the actual field price of the product in shops. It is the difference between a 
subject's bid at Stage 5 and the same subject's bid at Stage 1 for the same product. Note that a similar 
                                                      
8 When subjects bought more than two products, a draw determined which two products they actually purchased. 
9 Pen and paper were available for those participants (especially the older ones) who were not at ease with 
computers. Once their bid was made, a researcher assisted them in recording it on the computer. 
10 The melon auction also allowed subjects to become familiar with proposals of prices per kg. indicator is ΔWTPrecon. It measures the extent to which a subject revises her WTP for a given product 
once she has thought about the field price in order to propose estimation at Stage 2. Recall that no 
additional information is given between Stages 2 and 3.  
2. Estimation error of the FP. ΔFPestim =FP –FPestim 
ΔFPestim measures a subject’s error in the estimation of the field price of a given product. Practically, 
ΔFPestim is the difference between the estimation made by a subject at Stage 2 and the actual price 
given by the researcher (for the same product) at Stage 4. Note that, with this notation, ΔFPestim>0 
means an underestimation of the actual field-price and ΔFPestim<0 means an overestimation of the 
actual field-price.  
3. Elasticity of the WTP revision according to the estimation error. Elast = ΔWTPrevis/ ΔFPestim  
Elast is the ratio of the two previous indicators. It measures the elasticity of a subject’s revision of her 
WTP, induced by the FP disclosure and based on her error of estimation of the FP for the same 
product
11. This ratio constitutes the crucial indicator for the purpose of this paper. 
4. Minimum Subjective Surplus. SS = FPestim - WTPstand  
SS measures the difference between WTPstand  and FPestim  for a given product by a given subject. If the 
product is considered for its exchange value, if we neglect both transaction costs and risk aversion, and 
if we posit that the subject behaves rationally in the auction, then SS might be equal to zero, as the 
subject might bid the exact value of the product.    
5. Minimum Objective Surplus. OS = FP – WTPrev/FP  
OS is the objective version of SS, i.e. it is the same indicator, considering the objective actual FP 
instead of its estimation by the subject. If we consider the product for its exchange value, we anticipate 
OS<SS when the subject is risk averse (which is the standard hypothesis for subjects in the lab), as the 
FP is obvious when disclosed and not subject to error as FPestim is. When the product is considered 
(only) for its use value, the FP disclosure should not have any impact on the WTP if the subject is 
fully informed of the characteristics of the product. In other words, a ΔWTPrevis different from zero 
would mean, when considering a product for its use value, that the subject considered the price as a 
sign of the product’s quality. In such a case, OS<SS is not obvious.  
Finally, it is useful to note that the difference between OS and SS is directly related to the error of 
estimation of the field price and the elasticity of the WTP revision according to the estimation error. 
For instance, an underestimation of FP associated with an elasticity inferior to one generates OS > SS. 
 
C.  Subjects and products 
The experiments took place in the GAEL experimental economics laboratory at the INP of Grenoble. 
There were 8 sessions, each with 14 to 16 participants for a total of 124 subjects. The recruitment was 
                                                      







Δ tan ). The absolute measure has the advantage of not excluding subjects with 
WTPstand=0 and is coherent with our measure of OS–SS (Point 6). conducted in Grenoble and its suburbs by professionals in telemarketing and under the supervision of 
the GAEL laboratory. The sample was constructed to be representative: 53 males and 71 females aged 
from 16 to 83 (with an average age of 45). The subjects were remunerated a fixed amount of €20. 
According to their experimental decisions, subjects could earn additional money in Stage 2 and buy a 
maximum of 2 products during the auction stages. The amount paid for the product(s) was then 
deducted from the experimental gain. 
The products on sale are listed in Table 2. We chose these products with great care as we knew that the 
impact of the price-tag knowledge could vary not only in magnitude but also in sign (according to a 
subject’s over- or underestimation of the FP). The authors considered that the product choice of 
previous studies (Brookshire et al., 1987, Drichoutis et al., 2008, etc.) had been a weakness. In this 
experiment the products were therefore chosen mainly for their heterogeneity and their relatively low 
market value. These items differed in several respects: some were common consumer goods and 
therefore had a well-known market price (bread, crisps, bananas); some were relatively new or rare 
(smoothies, hyssop jelly, cotton bags); finally, some had specific characteristics (fair-trade, organic, 
and nutritional). We expected some products to be widely overestimated (bag) or underestimated 
(jelly). This heterogeneity is important as we did not want our experimental observations to be specific 
to a certain type of product. 
Overall, the experiment that reported here has several advantages compared with previous studies on 
the same topic, as it includes: i) the elicitation of the field price estimation by the subjects: the 
examination of the subjects’ belief as to the field price is essential when examining its effect on WTP; 
ii) a within procedure: WTP without the field price information and WTP with the field price are 
elicited with the same subjects, which prevents variance due to sampling; iii) a relevant set of 
products: robust results need products with heterogeneous characteristics as price information may 
have a different impact on different products; and finally iv) non-student subjects: participants are real 
consumers used to shopping. 
 
3.   HYPOTHESIS 
 
We propose to test the following four hypotheses. We first consider a frictionless market and then 
reflect on the possible effects of friction. 
H1. Stable and independent (from the Field Price) WTP 
Private valuation (PV), known by the bidder, is accurately revealed by WTP in the lab. This is true 
whether the bidder knows or the actual FP or not.  
The bidder knows what value he attaches to the object by the time the bidding starts. (The bidder 
implicitly ignores others’ values, though knowledge of others’ valuation would not affect how much 
the object was worth for him, the bidder). This hypothesis is plausible when the value of the object to 
a bidder is derived from its consumption or use alone, i.e. from how much utility he would derive from 
possessing it. The WTP is not influenced by the outside FP. The disclosure of the latter therefore has 
no impact and WTPstand = WTPFP. Thus, 
Elast = 0  (1) H2. Price Cap WTP 
Private valuation is accurately revealed by WTP in the lab if (and only if) PV stands below the posted 
price (actual or estimated). 
The laboratory is not impervious to the outside world and even though the bidder values the object for 
its use value, she also considers the opportunity cost of buying it in the laboratory compared to buying 
it later in the field. She will not pay more than the field price (Harrison et al. (2004) refer to this as 
field-price censoring). We thus have WTPstand = min{PV, FPestim} and WTPFP = min{PV, FP}. Four 
cases emerge: 
PV ≤ FPestim, FP FPestim, FP  ≤ PV FPestim ≤ PV ≤ FP FP ≤ PV ≤ FPestim   
                  (2) 
Elast = 0  Elast = 1  0 < Elast < 1  0 < Elast < 1   
 
H3. Arbitrage WTP 
WTP does not reveal private valuation because it is hidden by common values when the 
interdependence stems from resale considerations.  
If a bidder assigns value on the basis of how much the object would fetch in the resale market, then the 
private valuation vanishes behind interdependent values (Krishna, 2010). If the outside-the-lab market 
for the object is pure and without transaction costs, then the situation may be described as one of pure 
common value, because even if the value is ignored by bidders by the time of the auction, it is the 
same for all bidders. Therefore, each bidder offers the field price or what she thinks the field price is. 
Consequently, 
Elast = 1   (3) 
 
H4. Price signal and unstable WTP  
Private valuation is revealed but, as it is only estimated by the bidder, price revelation may be used as 
a signal for quality expertise and lead to a revision of the valuation.  
The Field Price signals quality. When bidders make an error in the estimation of FP, they revise their 
PV towards the FP. In the case of underestimation (respectively overestimation), bidders have 
underestimated (overestimated) the quality of the good and increase (decrease) their PV. We have 
WTP = PV = f(FP) with f’≥0. Thus, 
0 ≤ Elast   (4) 
 
In a more realistic setting, the purchase in the laboratory, compared to the purchase outside the 
laboratory, generates hidden costs
12. We have identified the following: 
Transaction Costs – Buying within the laboratory may generate transaction costs. They may be either 
positive or negative. For instance, it may save the buyer a trip to the closest shop (gain of time and 
money) if she was in any case going to buy the good auctioned sooner or later. On the other hand, the 
                                                      
12 The same costs may exist for the purchase of goods within a particular shop compared to the other shops. bidder may not feel disposed to purchase at the precise moment of the experiment (e.g. she may not be 
willing to be loaded with goods as she has planned to go to the movies).  
Risk Premium and Commitment Costs – The ignorance of FP may decrease bids. First, risk-adverse 
bidders may seek a risk premium when they are uncertain about the FP. Such bidders may want to 
avoid bidding above FP and lower their bids accordingly. Second, bidders may seek compensation for 
the renunciation of future learning opportunities as buying within the laboratory prevents the buyer 
from delaying her purchase decision until more information is gathered (about the market context). 
Zhao and Kling (2001) refer to this as commitment costs.  
Market frictions have no impact on the prediction of H1 and H4 per se as we have assumed that bidders 
are not looking for substitutes out of the lab (i.e. no opportunity costs). Once we allow links between 
the lab and the field, frictions complicate the predictions. In H2 for instance, transaction cost may shift 
the price cap either upwards or backwards (depending on its sign). Therefore, it turns out to be 
adventurous to determine it without additional assumptions, whether the private values are above or 
below the price cap. In the perspective of arbitrage (H3), bidders may strive to ensure a bigger surplus 
when there are uncertainties about FP: risk-adverse bidders are willing to make sure that their bids lie 
comfortably below FP and bidders may seek compensation for the commitment. Both effects generate 
SS > OS. 
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
A.  Overview 
Figure 1 displays an overview of our results. Each graph is dedicated to one of the eight products. The 
two columns at the rear represent (left) the average field price estimation (FPesti) and (right) the actual 
field price (FP). The columns in the front represent the average WTP before (left) and after (right) the 
announcement of the field price (respectively WTPstand and WTPFP). Therefore, on each of these 
figures, the gap between the two rear columns measures the mean estimation error of the FP 
(ΔestimFP), and the gap between the two front columns measures the mean revision of the willingness 
to pay (ΔrevisWTP). Finally, subjective surplus SS (respectively the objective surplus) can be viewed 
by looking at the difference between the two left columns (or the two right columns). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
INSERT TABLE 2 
Table 2 sums up the means of our different indicators per product by differentiating situations where 
bidders underestimate, overestimate or accurately estimate FP.  
We also check the impact of the ‘Price is Right’ procedure on the WTPs. As there is no additional 
external information given to subjects between Stage 1 and Stage 3, no economics standard hypothesis 
would support a change in WTP at this stage. However, the issue of price might have a psychological 
effect on a subject and modify his or her WTP. Therefore, apart from the documented effect on WTP 
of a mere repetition of an auction, a difference between WTPstand  and WTPrecon might be due to a 
saliency effect of the field price issue. WTPrecon is on average slightly superior to WTPstand (€1.17 vs €1.12) although the hyssop jelly is the only product that has a significant difference between WTPStand 
and WTPrecon (Wicoxon matched-pair test, p=0.0112; all the other products have p>0.05).  
 
B.  Values and Prices 
 Subjects do not properly estimate the field prices 
OBSERVATION 1: ΔestimFP≠0. Subjects do not properly estimate the field prices. The direction 
(whether subjects underestimate or overestimate the field price) and the extent of the estimation errors 
depend on the nature of the product.  
When applying a t-test to the 8 products, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that ΔestimFP is 
different from zero. Nevertheless, the rejection of this hypothesis only means that the subjects’ errors 
on the 8 products are centred on zero. In fact, only 3% of the individual estimations were strictly 
correct and 17% were correct within a 10% range. Looking at them product by product, 
overestimations do not compensate for underestimations (or inversely). While prices for both bananas 
and organic bags are underestimated on average, prices for smoothies, jellies, crisps and both types of 
baguette bread are overestimated
13. The magnitude of errors is also related to the nature of the product. 
New or unfamiliar products like smoothies, hyssop jelly or organic bags exhibit larger estimation 
errors (respectively -41.8%, -30.5% and +116.7%) than more commonly-used products like baguette 
bread (-0.6%), ‘balanced’ baguettes (-9.9%) and packets of crisps (-16.6%). Results for both types of 
banana are more surprising (+60.8% for the ‘normal’ bananas and +22.3% for the fair-trade bananas). 
 Subjects want a surplus 
OBSERVATION 2: SS>0 and OS>0. Subjects do not confuse values and prices. On the basis of their FP 
estimation or FP knowledge, they are looking for a good deal in the lab.  
For every product of our set, WTPstand is significantly lower than FPestim (Wilcoxon signed rank test, 
p=0.0000). On average, subjects are willing to pay €0.79 less than their field price estimation. At the 
individual level, 77% of the decisions display lower WTPstand than FPestim and 9.3% exhibit the same 
amount. We find similar results once the actual field price is announced: WTPFP is significantly lower 
than the FP (p=0.0000), with an average difference of €0.84. The proportion of WTPFP>FP is 
significantly lower than the proportion of WTPstand>FPestim (Fisher Exact, p=0.0189). Without price 
information, bidders are willing to pay less than what they think the price is. Once the field price is 
known, subjects are still willing to pay less than the price. Subjects are (objective or subjective) 
surplus seekers: they are not willing to pay as much for a product in the lab as they would have to pay 
outside the lab. These results support the Field Price Censoring of Harrison et al. (2004). This effect is 
strengthened by FP disclosure
14.  
Elasticity is on average positive and inferior to one 
                                                      
13 Differences between the estimation means and the relevant field prices are significant at the 5% level for the 
fair-trade bananas and at the 1% level for all the other products according to a t-test. 
14 Harrison et al. (2004), using the data of Hoffman et al. (1993), observe that WTPstand<FP. This is not always 
true here, even on average. Subjects may bid above the actual FP (the frequency of WTPstand>FP reaches 52.4% 
for bananas). The position of WTPstand relative to FP is dependent on the error of estimation their bidders have 
made. For instance, Hoffman et al. (1993)’s participants may have underestimated the field price of steaks 
whereas our participants have overestimated the field price of bananas.   OBSERVATION 3: 0 < Elast < 1. On average, subjects revise their willingness to pay with the same sign 
of their estimation error. This means that the average WTP decreases (increases) with the FP 
disclosure when FP has generally been overestimated (underestimated).  The magnitude of the WTP 
revision is smaller than the magnitude of the estimation error. Surprisingly, the elasticity does not 
happen to be larger when the FP is overestimated.  
The great majority of subjects revise their willingness to pay in the same direction as their error of 
estimation: ΔrevisWTP>0 when ΔestimFP>0 and ΔrevisWTP<0 when ΔestimFP<0. At the individual 
level, 53.7% of the WTPs are revised either downward when the field price is overestimated or upward 
when the field price is underestimated. Nonetheless, WTPs are revised in the opposite direction for 
20.8% of the revision decisions (Fisher exact p=0.0000). It is worth mentioning that for one quarter of 
the decisions, WTPstand is equal to WTPFP. The magnitude of WTP revisions is lower than the 
magnitude of error estimations: ΔrevisWTP<ΔestimFP. Among the cases of underestimations, WTPs 
increase in average by €0.21 when the estimations of the FP were in average €0.84 below the correct 
estimation. As for the cases of overestimations, WTPs decrease in average by €0.33 when the 
estimations of the FP were €1.31 above the actual FP. As may be expected, the average WTP revision 
is null among the subjects with accurate estimations of the FP. 
OBSERVATION 4: ΔrevisWTP is monotonic with ΔestimFP, and ΔrevisWTP seems to be roughly linear 
to ΔestimFP. In other words, the larger the error estimation, the greater the revision of the willingness 
to pay will be. 
In Figure 2 we categorize decisions in deciles according to the error estimations. The first decile 
contains the decisions with the largest overestimations and the 10
th decile contains the decisions with 
the largest underestimations. One can clearly see that ΔrevisWTP increase monotonically: the larger 
the overestimation (underestimation), the larger the decrease (increase) of the WTP will be. 
Furthermore, the elasticity is relatively stable over the deciles – apart from the 4
th one
15 – with the 
mean values (0.27, 0.12, 0.37, 0.30, 0.23, 0.26, 0.23, 0.26, 0.24). The median test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the Elasts of these deciles are identical (χ
2(8)=10.0959, p=0.258)
16,17. Similarly, when 
the field-price is overestimated, Elast is not significantly different from when FP is underestimated 
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney, p=0.4808).  
--- FIGURE 2 HERE--- 
A constant elasticity would mean a linear relationship between ΔrevisWTP and ΔestimFP. That is what 
we may look for in Table 2. The coefficient a, (i.e. Elast), is equal to 0.26 and is highly significant. 
The intercept is null. The scatter plot of the regression is displayed in Figure 3. 
--- FIGURE 3 HERE --- 
--- TABLE 3 HERE --- 
OBSERVATION 5: Individually, the subjective surplus (SS) is not systematically larger or equal to the 
objective surplus (OS). 
                                                      
15 In the 4
th decile, Elast = -2.58. This is essentially due to the very small denominator of Elast as this decile 
comprises all the estimation errors that are equal or very close to zero. This makes the elasticity highly volatile 
as even small changes in WTPs have a big impact on its value. 
16 If we include Elast of the 4
th decile, the median test cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level: 
χ
2(9)=14.8606, p=0.095. 
17 The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sample test corroborates the median test. We applied the 45 tests 
(including Elast of the fourth decile) and did not find any significant result at the 5% level.  We saw above in Section 1 (indicator 6) that OS – SS = ΔestimFP (1 – Elast). This means that OS > SS 
when ΔestimFP>0 (underestimation of the actual field-price) and OS < SS when ΔestimFP<0 
(overestimation of the FP). This is largely confirmed by the data: for example, only 25.6% of the 
decisions have SS > OS when FP is overestimated and only 11.3% have SS < OS when FP is 
underestimated (i.e. Elast>1). The rationale is simple. With 0 < Elast < 1, WTP’s adjustments do not 
entirely match the estimation errors. Consequently, surplus increases from Stage 1 (SS) to Stage 3 
(OS) when ΔestimFP is positive and decreases when ΔestimFP is negative. 
 
C.  Assessment of our four hypotheses 
H1 Stable and independent WTP – FP has no impact on bids in only one quarter of all cases (see the 
first row of Table 4). Unsurprisingly, bidders are sensitive to the price disclosure. The idealistic 
situation where the laboratory is able to elicit private valuation independently from the field (H1) is 
clearly not verified. 
--- TABLE 4 HERE --- 
H2 Price Cap WTP – Although frictions confuse the clear predictions of Section 3, one can still state 
than bidders with high PV (small surplus) should be more elastic than bidders with low PV (large 
surplus). Table 5 shows medians of Elast depending on whether SS and OS are below or above 0.25
18. 
Elasticity is significantly higher for bidders with SS≤0.25 than for bidders with SS>0.25 (medians of 
0.25 vs. 0.00, p=0.0228 with a Wilcoxon ranksum test). That is, bidders who are bidding up to what 
they perceive to be the field price change their bid when they realize that their field price expectations 
were wrong. They do so to a greater extent than bidders who bid below their expectation of FP. 
Similarly, elasticity is significantly higher for bidders with OS≤0.25 than for bidders with OS>0.25 
(0.33 vs. 0.00, p=0.0001): bidders with high PV are paying more attention to the opportunity to buy 
outside the lab. We also find significant difference when one combines low SS and OS compared to 
high SS and OS: 0.50 vs. 0.00, p=0.0000). If aggregate results validate H2, the large dispersion in 
individual data (Table 4) calls for caution. 
--- TABLE 5 HERE --- 
H3 Arbitrage WTP – Bidders do not systematically offer the field price or what they perceive to be the 
field price (Elast≠1). Even when we take into account risk aversion and commitment costs, we do not 
find that SS is systematically larger than the objective surplus OS. Bidders do not seek higher 
surpluses in riskier situations (uncertainty about the true value of FP) or in situations with higher 
commitment costs. This would have been the case if subjects had considered the products only for 
their exchange value, with both doubts about their valuation of the FP and risk aversion. This is 
clearly not the case and we may therefore conclude that subjects consider the products offered in the 
lab at least partially for their use value. 
H4 Price Signal and unstable WTP – The field price acts here as a quality signal and therefore 
performs as an attractor to the PV (Elast>0). That would be the case in 53.7% of the experimental 
situations. One can imagine that the price has different degrees of influence, depending on the 
individual, and that there are individuals for whom prices of some products do not signal quality 
(25.5%). However, H4 can hardly explain the 20.8% of situations where Elast<0. Furthermore, it is 
                                                      
18 The threshold of 0.25 has been chosen arbitrarily in order to obtain samples that are comparable in size. 
Conclusions remain robust with a threshold of 0. intuitive to assume that the price signal will signal more when the product is unknown than when it is 
common. This is not verified by our data as we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference of 
Elast between the hyssop jelly and the baguette (p=0.5934, Wilcoxon ranksum test). 
 
5.  DISCUSSION AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAB  
 
Our results clearly show that FP influences WTP. First, bidders revise their bid when they learn about 
FP and, second, the extent of the revision depends on the distance between FP and what bidders 
expected it to be. (We show that the elasticity of the WTP revision according to the estimation error is 
significant and positive, and can be roughly approximate to one quarter of the error). The impact of FP 
on WTP affects the interpretation of the data when the experiment aims at eliciting private valuations. 
FP should not impact PV if bidders value a good only for their private consumption (H1). Conversely, 
FP generates a common value if bidders carry out an arbitrage operation on the goods auctioned (H3). 
While PVs are perfectly elicited in the lab in H1, bids elicit common value only in H3. Neither of the 
hypotheses have been verified in our data and the truth may well lie between these two extreme 
situations: PV is either unstable (H4) or partially veiled behind the common value (H2). Clear 
discrimination between the two proposals comes across market frictions: the extent of commitment 
costs and transaction costs blurs the actual position of PV relative to FP. The individual identification 
of these costs would help to validate H2. If not, H4 would be an alternative. 
What are the normative implications of our results in terms of protocol design?   
The easiest way to confine subjects to their private value (then H1 or H4), by limiting reference to 
common value (and then excluding H2 and H3), is to design a protocol where they are informed that, if 
they buy a product, it will be compulsory for them to consume it. This is strictly controlled when the 
protocol includes an ‘in the lab’ immediate and compulsory consumption of all products bought during 
a session. Unfortunately, while it is easy to implement such a procedure for some food products – a 
sandwich or a coffee –, it is obviously impossible to do so for many others. Note two other limits of 
such a design. First, having to consume it immediately in the lab may dramatically alter the use value 
of a product, even if its consumption is technically possible. One would greatly value a beer consumed 
at home in the evening after the session, but attach very little value to the same beer drunk quickly in 
the lab before leaving a session. Second, the price posted outside may act as such: “I can have the 
same beer within 10 minutes if I buy it at the market price from the corner shop”. Immediate 
consumption is a (relatively) efficient way to control and avoid the elicitation of common value rather 
than private value in the lab.  
When, for any reason, products cannot be consumed immediately in the lab, common value elicitation 
cannot be eliminated.  As we have seen, a major source of poor control of common value lies outside 
the lab transaction costs. Therefore, if one cannot eliminate them, a proper design will try to control 
these costs. A good way to do so is to introduce an announced “field price posted market” in the lab at 
the end of sessions. To control and objectify the price cap in H2, the protocol should simply guarantee 
that products bought during the auctions will be bought back on request by the experimentalist at the 
end of the session. When additionally the posted price is given to the subjects, then the price cap is 
totally under control: rational bids cannot exceed this single, obvious and common knowledge cap. If 
ignored, then a belief exploration of the subjective posted price is required, but control is then 
loosened by risk aversion.  In addition of the previously described end-of-session ‘buy back posted market at field price’, the 
experimentalist may implement a ‘selling posted market at (the same) field price’. With such a design, 
we guarantee and control H3 (arbitrage) without transaction costs, and without possible arbitration, as 
it needs price discrimination. In such a context, any product in the lab, whatever it is, is transformed 
into a (certain) financial product, therefore with no common value. If the field price is given to the 
subjects, all rational bids should be at this field price. (Note that this design is Vernon Smith 
redemption value equivalent.) 
What sort of protocol would stress H1 against H2? We justify H4 on the basis of the field price used by 
subjects as a signal of quality. Therefore, the more information is given to subjects about products, the 
less the signal is necessary. Suppose we sell Bordeaux wine in the lab on the sole basis of blind 
testing. A non-expert consumer would learn a lot about the quality of a wine if given its field price 
(that may currently vary from 5€ to 500€) even if he or she focused only on the private value. This 
price might significantly influence a reasonable consumer’s WTP. If less information is supplied 
concerning the attributes of products delivered in the lab than those (believed) to be available in the 
field, uncontrolled commitment costs are rational and must be taken into account in interpreting the 
results. A particular attribute, generally neglected in the literature but that might have a significant 
effect because it obviously links field price and WTP, is production costs. We know that WTP for fruit 
and vegetables is often low because a significant proportion of consumers believe that the cost is null 
(or just equal to the picking costs). On the contrary, one may over-evaluate the cost of a night in a 5-
star hotel because of the extreme luxury in the lobby, without taking into account the fact that this cost 
is divided by the 800 rooms of the palace, rented 365 days a year. With a (believed) competitive 
market, field prices strictly reflect cost and might influence WTP, especially for a single purchase (the 
consumer will then adjust his or her demand in relation to the quantities). 
  
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
We show in this paper that field prices influence willingness to pay in the lab. We have good reasons 
to believe that field prices also influence willingness to pay in the field. Therefore, experiments aimed 
at measuring WTP in the lab should pay particular attention to this price variable for the sake of 
parallelism and realism.  
Experimental economics builds its scientific reputation on its excellent ability to control economic 
environments and to isolate and therefore measure variables. Our first result is that field prices do 
indeed influence WTP in the lab, whether they are revealed or not (in the latter case the influence is 
through beliefs). We analyze the reasons for such an influence with two types of reason. The first type 
of reason results from common value considerations. A subject who has the opportunity to buy a good 
in the lab may question the price at which he can buy (or resell) the same product in the field. He may 
also question the amount of the transaction costs that such a deal would generate. We propose new 
designs: (i) to control (eliminate) the induced transaction costs, and (ii) to control (reveal) the field 
price. These new designs will help to separate subjects’ private and common valuations. The second 
type of reason for linking WTP and field price results from private value considerations. Here price is 
taken as a quality (or cost) signal. This is rational when markets are competitive, individual 
preferences are close to average ones, and product attributes are partially ignored. In such a context, 
field prices may be rationally taken as a privately valuable attribute. We propose to take this rationale 
into account in the design of experiments. First, we increase control and parallelism by delivering the field price to the subjects before auctioning a product. Second, when it is neither possible nor desirable 
to reveal field prices, the control is increased if subjects’ field price beliefs are collected in parallel 
with their WTP. 
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Table 1: The experimental design: stages, procedures and variables 
Stage  Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3  Stage 4  Stage 5 
Used Procedure   Vickrey 
Auction  
4th Price 

































Table 2: Summary Statistics 
  n  FPestim FP  WTPstand WTPFP ΔFPestim  ΔWTPrevis
Smoothie  124  1.57 € 2.70 € 1.04 €  1.33 €  +1.13 €  +0.29 € 
Banana  124  1.59 € 0.99 € 1.03 €  0.71 €  -0.60 €  -0.31 € 
Fair-Trade Banana  124  2.24 € 1.99 € 1.46 €  1.31 €  -0.25 €  -0.15 € 
Hyssop Jelly  124  3.75 € 5.40 € 2.21 €  2.75 €  +1.65 €  +0.54 € 
Baguette  124  0.90 € 1.00 € 0.77 €  0.80 €  +0.10 €  +0.03 € 
Organic Bag  124  3.25 € 1.50 € 1.27 €  0.90 €  -1.75 €  -0.37 € 
Crisps  124  1.08 € 1.29 € 0.59 €  0.68 €  +0.21 €  +0.09 € 





All Products  992  1.90 € 1.98 € 1.12 €  1.14 €  +0.07 €  +0.02 € 
Smoothie  10  3.24 € 2.70 € 1.84 €  1.97 €  -0.54 €  + 0.13 € 
Banana  96  1.82 € 0.99 € 1.15 €  0.74 €  -0.83 €  -0.40 € 
Fair-Trade Banana  58  3.12 € 1.99 € 2.00 €  1.49 €  -1.13 €  -0.51 € 
Hyssop Jelly  16  7.10 € 5.40 € 4.02 €  4.27 €  -1.70 €  +0.25 € 
Baguette  22  1.27 € 1.00 € 1.16 €  1.08 €  -0.27 €  -0.08 € 
















Crisps  28  1.87 € 1.29 € 0.78 €  0.76 €  -0.58 €  -0.02 € Balanced Baguette  30  1.18 € 0.95 € 0.82 €  0.79 €  -0.23 €  -0.04 € 
All Products  342  2.87 € 1.56 € 1.49 €  1.16 €  -1.31 €  -0.33 € 
Smoothie  1  2.70 € 2.70 € 1.07 €  1.05 €  0.00 €  -0.02 € 
Banana  5  0.99 € 0.99 € 0.60 €  0.56 €  0.00 €  -0.04 € 
Fair-Trade Banana  0  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Hyssop Jelly  2  5.40 € 5.40 € 4.73 €  4.95 €  0.00 €  +0.23 € 
Baguette  7  1.00 € 1.00 € 1.01 €  0.83 €  0.00 €  -0.19 € 
Organic Bag  8  1.50 € 1.50 € 0.50 €  0.64 €  0.00 €  +0.14 € 
Crisps  1  1.29 € 1.29 € 0.00 €  0.00 €  0.00 €  0.00 € 

















All Products  30  1.48 € 1.48 € 0.93 €  0.93 €  0.00 €  -0.01 € 
Smoothie  113  1.41 € 2.70 € 0.97 €  1.27 €  +1.29 €  +0.31 € 
Banana  23  0.76 € 0.99 € 0.62 €  0.63 €  +0.23 €  +0.01 € 
Fair-Trade Banana  66  1.46 € 1.99 € 0.99 €  1.16 €  +0.53 €  +0.17 € 
Hyssop Jelly  106  3.21 € 5.40 € 1.89 €  2.49 €  +2.19 €  +0.59 € 
Baguette  95  0.81 € 1.00 € 0.67 €  0.74 €  +0.19 €  +0.07 € 
Organic Bag  34  0.80 € 1.50 € 0.72 €  0.72 €  +0.70 €  0.00 € 
Crisps  95  0.84 € 1.29 € 0.55 €  0.67 €  +0.45 €  +0.12 € 

















All Products  620  1.39 € 2.23 € 0.92 €  1.14 €  +0.84 €  +0.21 € 
 
 
Table 3: Linear approximation to Estimation Errors  
ΔrevisWTP  Coefficient  Standard Error  t  p > |t| 
ΔestimFP  0.2639
***  0.0180  14.69  0.000 
(ΔestimFP)
2  -0.0063  0.0043  -1.47  0.142 
(ΔestimFP)
3  -0.0002  0.0002  -1.11  0.266 
Intercept  0.0258  0.0266  0.97  0.332 
R
2  0.1959 
 
  
Table 4: Frequency of situations according the value of Elast 
Frequency  Elast < 0  Elast = 0  0 < Elast < 1 Elast = 1  Elast > 1 
Overall  200 (20.8%)  245 (25.5%)  340 (35.3%)  20 (2.1%)  157 (16.3%) 
SS≤0.25  109 (25%)  66 (15%)  166 (38%)  17 (4%)  83 (19%) 
SS>0.25  91 (17%)  179 (34%)  174 (33%)  3 (1%)  74 (14%) 
OS≤0.25  80 (23%)  50 (14%)  130 (37%)  17 (5%)  78 (22%) 
OS>0.25  120 (20%)  195 (32%)  210 (35%)  3 (0%)  79 (13%) 
SS≤0.25 & OS>0.25  67 (34%)  26 (13%)  78 (40%)  0 (0%)  26 (13%) 
SS>0.25 & OS≤0.25  38 (34%)  10 (9%)  42 (38%)  0 (0%)  21 (19%) 
SS,OS≤0.25  42 (17%)  40 (16%)  88 (36%)  17 (7%)  57 (23%) 
SS,OS>0.25  53 (41%)  169 (41%)  132 (32%)  3 (1%)  53 (13%) 
 
Table 5: Median of Elast according the value of SS and OS 
Median of Elast 
(number of observations)
OS≤0.25  OS>0.25  All OS 
SS≤0.25  0.50 (244) 0.09 (197) 0.25 (441) 
SS>0.25  0.16 (111) 0.00 (410) 0.00 (521) 
All SS  0.33 (355) 0.00 (607) 0.11 (962) 
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This paper considers the external validity of the growing set of literature that uses laboratory auctions 
to reveal consumers’ willingness to pay for consumer goods, when the concerned goods are sold in 
retailing shops through posted price procedures. Here, the quality of the parallel between the field and 
the lab crucially depends on whether being informed of the actual field price influences a consumer’s 
willingness to pay for a good or not. We show that the elasticity of the WTP revision according to the 
field price estimation error is significant, positive, and can be roughly approximate to one quarter of 
the error. We then discuss the normative implications of these results for future experiments aimed at 
eliciting private valuations through auctions.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the seminal paper of Hoffman et al. (1993), auction selling procedures in laboratories have 
appeared as an appealing and challenging method for eliciting consumer preferences in applied 
studies. These new experimental methods tend to complement or even to substitute traditional surveys 
and questionnaires used for decades in marketing studies. They have been employed extensively for 
various purposes in applied economics (for a detailed survey, see Lusk and Shogren, 2007). Domains 
of application include product marketing (demand-led conception, packaging, pricing, etc.) and public 
regulation (labelling control, innovation acceptability, etc.). Numerous applications are found in the 
food industry, due to the complexity of the products, their attributes and labelling.  Previous studies 
have covered desirable characteristics – e.g. food safety (e.g. Buzby et al., 1998, Hayes et al., 1995) 
and animal welfare (Lusk and Norwood, 2008) –, less desirable ones – e.g. GMOs (Lusk et al., 2001, 
Noussair et al., 2004), hormones (Fox, 1995) and insecticides (Roosen et al., 1998) and, lastly, 
intrinsic or extrinsic characteristics – from countless studies on taste to fair-trade (Rousu and Corrigan, 
2008) –. The products or characteristic concerned might be available on the actual field consumer 
market (Wertenbroch and Skiera, 2002) or not (List, 2003). 
The large success of these experimental methods in applied research stems primarily from the fact that 
participants have real incentives for revealing the true value that they attribute to a product, contrary to 
hypothetical survey settings (among others, see Cummings et al., 1995; List and Shogren, 1998, and 
Neill et al., 1994). Another advantage of using experimental methods is that their results are expressed 
in money units, more useful for most users than hedonic marks or mere product ranking. In order to 
support this experimental method as a valuable tool in market research, the reliability of its estimates 
must be assessed, especially when they produce out-of-the-lab predictions. 
Preferences measured in the laboratory are defined in monetary terms by values, a value being the 
maximum amount that each bidder (buyer) is willing to pay.  Value is built by the buyer-consumer, 
and therefore known by her. Conversely, this value is ignored by the seller (here the experimentalist). 
The use of incentive-compatible auctions (Vickrey, 1961) or equivalent selling procedures such as 
BDM (Becker et al., 1964) for eliciting WTP (i.e. bid=WTP) has been validated scientifically in the 
best literature, both theoretically (Vickrey, 1961) and empirically, thanks to the ‘induced-value’ 
methodology introduced by Vernon Smith (1976). Reassured by these results based on redemption 
values of lab products, we can now legitimately use these procedures to elicit homegrown values for 
real life products, with the hypothesis: bid=WTP=home-grown value
2. Subsequent literature specifies 
precise technical conditions in the lab for this hypothesis to be sustainable: proper incentives, adequate 
learning procedures and explanations (List and Shogren, 1998), private information (to avoid 
affiliation, Corrigan and Rousu, 2006), n products for sale depending on the number of participants 
with Vickrey, etc.
3 In the present article we assume that this hypothesis holds, i.e. that bid=WTP, and 
focus on the content of this WTP. 
                                                      
2 Note that the expression ‘homegrown value’ qualifies the product, and not any behavior or preference. 
3 Nevertheless, theoretically equivalent procedures had been shown to have different degrees of efficiency in 
reveling redemption values in the lab. For instance, Noussair et al. (2004b) even observe significant differences 
between WTP in BDM procedures and WTP in Vickrey auctions. In this article we question the parallel between a revealed ‘in-the-lab’ WTP and an ignored ‘out-of-the-
lab’ WTP. Although Brookshire et al. (1987) could not find any significant difference between the 
‘real world’ and the lab for privately consumed commodities, various hindrances were identified as 
limiting the quality of the parallel between the lab and the field, i.e. the external validity of the 
method. In particular, we concentrate here on one (important) dimension of this problem: the price 
effect. In the field, at least in developed countries, most consumer goods are sold with posted price 
procedures. In the laboratory, we use auctions or BDM procedures. The external validity of such 
laboratory experiments may be limited, for two related reasons. First, the in- and out-of-the-lab selling 
procedures involve different decision processes (‘take it or leave it’ in the field, and ‘make a bid’ in 
the lab). By comparing posted prices and bilateral bargaining market institutions, Cason et al. (2003) 
show that the choice of the selling procedure influences outcomes. Second, there is another difference: 
the presence (in the field) or absence (in the lab) of a visible Field Price (FP) when taking a buying 
decision. The fact of the buyer knowing or ignoring the FP will pose a problem of parallelism if (and 
only if) WTP is dependent on the FP. In this case, the WTP in the lab (WTPlab) may differ from WTP 
in the field (WTPfield), and a bias may be introduced by the lab procedure
4. Note that if WTP depends 
on the field price, two distinct issues come up. One is parallelism. The other, of a much more general 
purpose, is the issue of the stability of WTPfield as it may depend on field price. If it does, various field 
prices (due to price discrimination, promotion, taxes or subsidies), may lead to various WTPfield. In 
developing countries, where prices are often defined with bilateral negotiation, the issue is even 
bigger. In this paper we concentrate on the question of parallelism, but we see that we cannot answer 
this question properly without keeping an eye on the issue of WTP in the field.  
The question of the (in)dependence of WTP from FP has already been addressed in the literature. 
Cherry et al. (2004) show with induced value that outsides options shave bids. Harrison et al. (2004) 
revisit the data of Hoffman et al. (1993) by estimating a random effects Tobit model with lower and 
upper limits. They reach the conclusion that ignoring the censoring of elicited values due to extra-
laboratory prices can significantly alter the results. Using a choice experiment, Carlsson et al. (2007) 
show that preferences are affected by the inclusion of a price. Recently, Drichoutis et al. (2008) used 
the procedure of Harrison et al. (2007) to show that subjects provided with reference price information 
bid on average €0.21 more for a sandwich than those who are not. To explain such results, Harrison et 
al. (2004) stress the importance of belief and knowledge of both price-tags and of the product 
characteristics. But the aforementioned experimental procedures do not include means to measure such 
beliefs.  
We propose a new protocol including three new variables in a well-controlled ‘within’ procedure. For 
each 128 subjects and for each of the 8 products for sale, we elicit the field price estimation (FPestim), 
parallel with the WTP (WTPstand). We then deliver – in a highly credible way – the actual FP of the 
product, and then re-measure WTP given this price (WTPFP). With such a protocol we are in a 
controlled environment for the first time, able to observe the actual impact of the price on WTP, 
knowing the actual information given to the subject when he discovers the field price, i.e. the distance 
between initial belief and the actual price. This ‘before-after’ procedure, using only auctions, appears 
to be most accurate one for our purpose. Posted-price vs. auction would come up against the poor 
information revealed by posted-price procedures in the lab. This is precisely why we opt for auctions! 
Of course, the potential influence, on WTP, of being informed of the FP depends on how much the 
                                                      
4 In their experiment, Issanchou et al. (2008) present the participant of a choice experiment at a baker with 
several price sets for different kinds of breads. WTP obtained are then compared to WTP elicited in the lab 
through BDM. While such protocols afford much insight on the effect that the selling procedure itself may have 
on WTP, the use of fictitious prices eliminates the effect of the price information on WTP. consumer actually learns from the FP disclosure. A subject who accurately approximated a FP would 
not change much when she disclosed that she was right (neglecting risk aversion). In our protocol, we 
are able to observe (a) WTP with and without the FP information and (b) what the bidder actually 
learns from the FP disclosure (the magnitude of her over- or underestimation). 
The ideal condition of validity would be independence and then the stability of the WTP, whether FP 
is known or not, and under- or overestimated or not. If, on the contrary, the WTP for a good is largely 
influenced by FP disclosure, the use of auction procedures in the lab would appear to exclude an 
important field variable. Theoretically, we propose to confront our results with four alternative 
hypotheses: H1. Stable WTP (WTP is independent from price). H2. Price capped WTP (WTP is stable 
up to a cap given by the price and transaction costs). H3. Arbitrage WTP (WTP is determined by ‘out-
of-the-lab’ reselling and buying prices).  H4. Price signalled WTP (WTP is influenced by the price, 
used as a signal for quality). Unlike strictly controlled laboratory redemption-value products, we 
know, since Adam Smith
5, that home-grown values for not purely financial products have a double 
face value: use value and exchange value. This double face of value may exist in and out of the lab. In 
his reference textbook on auction theory, Krishna (2010) distinguishes between cases when the value 
of the auctioned good is derived from its sole consumption or use, and situations where the value of 
the auctioned good is based on how much it will fetch in the resale market. In the first context, values 
are heterogeneous among subjects and are independent on others’ behaviours. Bids then reflect strictly 
private values. In the second set of situations, values are homogeneous among subjects and bids reflect 
common values or interdependent values (see Krishna, 2010, for developments). A typical case of 
value ambivalence might be a vintage bottle of wine that the owner may either drink or resell (e.g. on 
E-Bay). Questioning your own WTP for such a bottle, you would consider both alternatives. H1 and H3 
stand for these two extreme situations. In H1, a subject may regard a good only for her personal or 
private consumption, namely for its use value. This would be for example if the buyer were forced to 
drink the bottle of wine, in or out of the lab. A current assumption in economics textbooks is that 
individuals have well-defined preferences. In this case, the elicited preferences for individual attributes 
should be independent of the price, revealed or not. FP has no effect on WTP. However, FP may still 
be useful and influence the subject’s WTP for private valuation, as it may be used as a signal of the 
quality of the good (H4). Here, we may posit that the more ignorant the subject is concerning the 
quality of the good, and simultaneously the more confident she is about the efficiency of the market 
and the similitude of her taste compared to other buyers’ tastes, the more her WTP is likely to be 
influenced by the FP disclosure.
6 However, in such situations the laboratory reveals private values. In 
H3, the subject regards a good for sale in the lab only as an exchange value. For such a subject, the FP 
therefore entirely determines the value
7. FP defines the common value and covers up private values. 
H2 corresponds to an intermediate situation. Subjects may regard the good auctioned as private value 
but would never bid more in the laboratory than the price they know or suppose they could buy the 
                                                      
5 “The word value, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility of some 
particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object 
conveys. The one may be called 'value in use;' the other, 'value in exchange.' The things which have the greatest 
value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange; and on the contrary, those which have the greatest 
value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than water: but it will 
purchase scarce anything; scarce anything can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce 
any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it.” (Wealth of 
Nations Book 1, chapter IV). In Capital I, K. Marx, following A. Smith, develops the analysis of the relation 
between exchange value and use value. 
6 A step further in the same direction would be to agree that, for certain consumers at least, the FP could be a 
valuable attribute as such. For such consumers, adjusting their WTP to the FP may be regarded as automatic.   
7 WTP=FP when one overlooks transaction costs, risk aversion and commitment costs (see Zhao and Kling, 
2004, for a definition of commitment costs) same product for in the field (here ignoring transaction costs). A subject will therefore not buy a good 
in the laboratory at a price superior to the objective or subjective field price. Harrison et al. (2004) 
refer to this as field-price censoring. In this case, the laboratory only partially reveals private values. 
Our results show that H1 and H3 are rejected. We also show that H2 alone does not exhaust the data. H4 
appears as a good candidate for explaining the residue. In our discussion, we support the idea that the 
lab reveals WTP close to field WTP, but that in and out of the lab WTPs are under posted price 
influence. We then conclude that, in experimental design aimed at measuring WTP for marketed 
products, FP might be introduced every time it is available and not a treatment variable. We also 
propose a systematic exploration of FP estimation when no actual field price is available, and/or 
pricing is at stake. Of course, one may reasonably accept the fact that, for a typical consumer, an 
offered good in the lab has both an exchange value and a use value, and therefore that these two lines 
of reasoning apply at the same time, more or less depending on the type of good supplied.  
Section (2) of this paper now presents our experimental design in more detail, with the subjects and 
indicators that will serve our analysis. Sections 3 and 4 then present the hypothesis and the results. 
After a brief discussion in Section 5, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
Our experimental design is based on three main principles: 
 (i)  WTPs are elicited through auctions. Although consumers scarcely purchase goods through 
auctions, such procedures remain the most relevant for measuring individual WTP in labs. In the lab 
posted-price sales are realistic but provide poor results, as consumers choose only yes or no for a given 
good at a given price. Therefore, the researcher may multiply the number of sales by implementing 
several artificial prices. By doing so, buyers lose the information conveyed by an actual field price. 
 (ii)  The effect of FP on WTPs is examined by observing bids before and after the introduction 
of price tags. The second idea is that the main difference between posted-price sales and auctions is 
the knowledge of the price tag. Whereas price tags may operate as a benchmark in posted-price sales, 
buyers may be unaware of them in auctions. To be successful, one must be credible when providing 
the price tags. 
 (iii)  Beliefs relative to out-of-the-lab price tags are examined. The third idea is that the 
observation of the WTP revisions is not enough. These beliefs may have an impact on the WTP 
revision when the price tag is introduced. In other words, consumers may react differently to the price 
introduction, whether they under- or overestimate it. The price disclosure may come as a bad or a good 
surprise and thus impact preferences in positively or negatively. The magnitude of this impact could 
moreover be expected to be correlated with the distance (positive or negative) between the field price 
and field price estimation. 
 
A.  Procedure and variables  
Table 1 below describes the sequence of the experiment. ---TABLE 1 HERE--- 
Each stage 1, 3 and 5 consists of 8 simultaneous 4
th price Vickrey auctions. 8 different products are 
being sold simultaneously on these auctions. In each auction at each stage, 3 items of the same product 
are being sold to the 3 highest bidders. The price is defined by the 4
th highest bid. During each of these 
stages 1, 3 and 5, the task of each subject is to place 8 bids for the 8 different products for sale 
(detailed below).  
Not every auction ends up with an effective sale. In order to avoid endowment and substitution effects, 
each subject knows that he/she will not end up purchasing more than two items
8. Bids are anonymous 
and computerized
9. No information on bids and prices was given to the subjects during the 
experiment.  
Before Stage 1, subjects participated in two practice auctions. One melon
10 and 3 soda cans were sold 
respectively at the 2
nd and 4
th bid in a Vickrey auction. At the end of each learning auction, the 
researchers discussed the winner(s) and the auction price with the audience. The winners then had to 
pay for the product they had won. This learning stage ensured a sound understanding of the sale 
procedure and of the non-hypothetical nature of the situation. 
The Stage 1 auction repeated the usual standard procedure used in experiments aimed at revealing 
WTP for real products. We call this first measure the standard willingness to pay (WTPstand). During 
Stage 2, the participants were asked to estimate the field price (FPestim). For each of the 8 products, 
they were encouraged to take this task seriously: the subject with the best estimation received €3. The 
second and the third best estimators received respectively €1 and €0.5. Stage 3 was technical. It was 
designed to check the stability of individual preferences for a product. In practical terms, it was a strict 
repetition of Stage 1. Without any additional information, subjects could reconsider their Stage 1 bids 
after guessing the FP (we call the bids collected at Stage 3 the WTP reconsidered or WTPrecon). In 
Stage 4, the actual field prices (FP) of the 8 products were disclosed to the subjects. In order to make 
this information on FP as credible as possible, we presented photographs of the products in situ, i.e. on 
shelves with clearly visible price tags. The place and date where the 8 products where originally 
bought by the researcher were also specified. Finally, in Stage 5, subjects made a last series of 8 bids 
for the 8 products, being informed of the FP. We call the data collected at this stage WTP revision 
knowing FP, or WTPFP. At the end of the experiment, one subject was asked to randomly select the 
auction stage (1, 3 or 5) that would be made effective for the purchases. 
 
B.  Indicators 
It is useful to define a series of indicators based on our collected data.  
1. WTP revision induced by the FP disclosure. ΔWTPrevis = WTPFP – WTPstand () 
ΔWTPrevis  measures the extent to which a subject revises her WTP for a given product once the 
researcher has disclosed the actual field price of the product in shops. It is the difference between a 
subject's bid at Stage 5 and the same subject's bid at Stage 1 for the same product. Note that a similar 
                                                      
8 When subjects bought more than two products, a draw determined which two products they actually purchased. 
9 Pen and paper were available for those participants (especially the older ones) who were not at ease with 
computers. Once their bid was made, a researcher assisted them in recording it on the computer. 
10 The melon auction also allowed subjects to become familiar with proposals of prices per kg. indicator is ΔWTPrecon. It measures the extent to which a subject revises her WTP for a given product 
once she has thought about the field price in order to propose estimation at Stage 2. Recall that no 
additional information is given between Stages 2 and 3.  
2. Estimation error of the FP. ΔFPestim =FP –FPestim 
ΔFPestim measures a subject’s error in the estimation of the field price of a given product. Practically, 
ΔFPestim is the difference between the estimation made by a subject at Stage 2 and the actual price 
given by the researcher (for the same product) at Stage 4. Note that, with this notation, ΔFPestim>0 
means an underestimation of the actual field-price and ΔFPestim<0 means an overestimation of the 
actual field-price.  
3. Elasticity of the WTP revision according to the estimation error. Elast = ΔWTPrevis/ ΔFPestim  
Elast is the ratio of the two previous indicators. It measures the elasticity of a subject’s revision of her 
WTP, induced by the FP disclosure and based on her error of estimation of the FP for the same 
product
11. This ratio constitutes the crucial indicator for the purpose of this paper. 
4. Minimum Subjective Surplus. SS = FPestim - WTPstand  
SS measures the difference between WTPstand  and FPestim  for a given product by a given subject. If the 
product is considered for its exchange value, if we neglect both transaction costs and risk aversion, and 
if we posit that the subject behaves rationally in the auction, then SS might be equal to zero, as the 
subject might bid the exact value of the product.    
5. Minimum Objective Surplus. OS = FP – WTPrev/FP  
OS is the objective version of SS, i.e. it is the same indicator, considering the objective actual FP 
instead of its estimation by the subject. If we consider the product for its exchange value, we anticipate 
OS<SS when the subject is risk averse (which is the standard hypothesis for subjects in the lab), as the 
FP is obvious when disclosed and not subject to error as FPestim is. When the product is considered 
(only) for its use value, the FP disclosure should not have any impact on the WTP if the subject is 
fully informed of the characteristics of the product. In other words, a ΔWTPrevis different from zero 
would mean, when considering a product for its use value, that the subject considered the price as a 
sign of the product’s quality. In such a case, OS<SS is not obvious.  
Finally, it is useful to note that the difference between OS and SS is directly related to the error of 
estimation of the field price and the elasticity of the WTP revision according to the estimation error. 
For instance, an underestimation of FP associated with an elasticity inferior to one generates OS > SS. 
 
C.  Subjects and products 
The experiments took place in the GAEL experimental economics laboratory at the INP of Grenoble. 
There were 8 sessions, each with 14 to 16 participants for a total of 124 subjects. The recruitment was 
                                                      







Δ tan ). The absolute measure has the advantage of not excluding subjects with 
WTPstand=0 and is coherent with our measure of OS–SS (Point 6). conducted in Grenoble and its suburbs by professionals in telemarketing and under the supervision of 
the GAEL laboratory. The sample was constructed to be representative: 53 males and 71 females aged 
from 16 to 83 (with an average age of 45). The subjects were remunerated a fixed amount of €20. 
According to their experimental decisions, subjects could earn additional money in Stage 2 and buy a 
maximum of 2 products during the auction stages. The amount paid for the product(s) was then 
deducted from the experimental gain. 
The products on sale are listed in Table 2. We chose these products with great care as we knew that the 
impact of the price-tag knowledge could vary not only in magnitude but also in sign (according to a 
subject’s over- or underestimation of the FP). The authors considered that the product choice of 
previous studies (Brookshire et al., 1987, Drichoutis et al., 2008, etc.) had been a weakness. In this 
experiment the products were therefore chosen mainly for their heterogeneity and their relatively low 
market value. These items differed in several respects: some were common consumer goods and 
therefore had a well-known market price (bread, crisps, bananas); some were relatively new or rare 
(smoothies, hyssop jelly, cotton bags); finally, some had specific characteristics (fair-trade, organic, 
and nutritional). We expected some products to be widely overestimated (bag) or underestimated 
(jelly). This heterogeneity is important as we did not want our experimental observations to be specific 
to a certain type of product. 
Overall, the experiment that reported here has several advantages compared with previous studies on 
the same topic, as it includes: i) the elicitation of the field price estimation by the subjects: the 
examination of the subjects’ belief as to the field price is essential when examining its effect on WTP; 
ii) a within procedure: WTP without the field price information and WTP with the field price are 
elicited with the same subjects, which prevents variance due to sampling; iii) a relevant set of 
products: robust results need products with heterogeneous characteristics as price information may 
have a different impact on different products; and finally iv) non-student subjects: participants are real 
consumers used to shopping. 
 
3.   HYPOTHESIS 
 
We propose to test the following four hypotheses. We first consider a frictionless market and then 
reflect on the possible effects of friction. 
H1. Stable and independent (from the Field Price) WTP 
Private valuation (PV), known by the bidder, is accurately revealed by WTP in the lab. This is true 
whether the bidder knows or the actual FP or not.  
The bidder knows what value he attaches to the object by the time the bidding starts. (The bidder 
implicitly ignores others’ values, though knowledge of others’ valuation would not affect how much 
the object was worth for him, the bidder). This hypothesis is plausible when the value of the object to 
a bidder is derived from its consumption or use alone, i.e. from how much utility he would derive from 
possessing it. The WTP is not influenced by the outside FP. The disclosure of the latter therefore has 
no impact and WTPstand = WTPFP. Thus, 
Elast = 0  (1) H2. Price Cap WTP 
Private valuation is accurately revealed by WTP in the lab if (and only if) PV stands below the posted 
price (actual or estimated). 
The laboratory is not impervious to the outside world and even though the bidder values the object for 
its use value, she also considers the opportunity cost of buying it in the laboratory compared to buying 
it later in the field. She will not pay more than the field price (Harrison et al. (2004) refer to this as 
field-price censoring). We thus have WTPstand = min{PV, FPestim} and WTPFP = min{PV, FP}. Four 
cases emerge: 
PV ≤ FPestim, FP FPestim, FP  ≤ PV FPestim ≤ PV ≤ FP FP ≤ PV ≤ FPestim   
                  (2) 
Elast = 0  Elast = 1  0 < Elast < 1  0 < Elast < 1   
 
H3. Arbitrage WTP 
WTP does not reveal private valuation because it is hidden by common values when the 
interdependence stems from resale considerations.  
If a bidder assigns value on the basis of how much the object would fetch in the resale market, then the 
private valuation vanishes behind interdependent values (Krishna, 2010). If the outside-the-lab market 
for the object is pure and without transaction costs, then the situation may be described as one of pure 
common value, because even if the value is ignored by bidders by the time of the auction, it is the 
same for all bidders. Therefore, each bidder offers the field price or what she thinks the field price is. 
Consequently, 
Elast = 1   (3) 
 
H4. Price signal and unstable WTP  
Private valuation is revealed but, as it is only estimated by the bidder, price revelation may be used as 
a signal for quality expertise and lead to a revision of the valuation.  
The Field Price signals quality. When bidders make an error in the estimation of FP, they revise their 
PV towards the FP. In the case of underestimation (respectively overestimation), bidders have 
underestimated (overestimated) the quality of the good and increase (decrease) their PV. We have 
WTP = PV = f(FP) with f’≥0. Thus, 
0 ≤ Elast   (4) 
 
In a more realistic setting, the purchase in the laboratory, compared to the purchase outside the 
laboratory, generates hidden costs
12. We have identified the following: 
Transaction Costs – Buying within the laboratory may generate transaction costs. They may be either 
positive or negative. For instance, it may save the buyer a trip to the closest shop (gain of time and 
money) if she was in any case going to buy the good auctioned sooner or later. On the other hand, the 
                                                      
12 The same costs may exist for the purchase of goods within a particular shop compared to the other shops. bidder may not feel disposed to purchase at the precise moment of the experiment (e.g. she may not be 
willing to be loaded with goods as she has planned to go to the movies).  
Risk Premium and Commitment Costs – The ignorance of FP may decrease bids. First, risk-adverse 
bidders may seek a risk premium when they are uncertain about the FP. Such bidders may want to 
avoid bidding above FP and lower their bids accordingly. Second, bidders may seek compensation for 
the renunciation of future learning opportunities as buying within the laboratory prevents the buyer 
from delaying her purchase decision until more information is gathered (about the market context). 
Zhao and Kling (2001) refer to this as commitment costs.  
Market frictions have no impact on the prediction of H1 and H4 per se as we have assumed that bidders 
are not looking for substitutes out of the lab (i.e. no opportunity costs). Once we allow links between 
the lab and the field, frictions complicate the predictions. In H2 for instance, transaction cost may shift 
the price cap either upwards or backwards (depending on its sign). Therefore, it turns out to be 
adventurous to determine it without additional assumptions, whether the private values are above or 
below the price cap. In the perspective of arbitrage (H3), bidders may strive to ensure a bigger surplus 
when there are uncertainties about FP: risk-adverse bidders are willing to make sure that their bids lie 
comfortably below FP and bidders may seek compensation for the commitment. Both effects generate 
SS > OS. 
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
A.  Overview 
Figure 1 displays an overview of our results. Each graph is dedicated to one of the eight products. The 
two columns at the rear represent (left) the average field price estimation (FPesti) and (right) the actual 
field price (FP). The columns in the front represent the average WTP before (left) and after (right) the 
announcement of the field price (respectively WTPstand and WTPFP). Therefore, on each of these 
figures, the gap between the two rear columns measures the mean estimation error of the FP 
(ΔestimFP), and the gap between the two front columns measures the mean revision of the willingness 
to pay (ΔrevisWTP). Finally, subjective surplus SS (respectively the objective surplus) can be viewed 
by looking at the difference between the two left columns (or the two right columns). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
INSERT TABLE 2 
Table 2 sums up the means of our different indicators per product by differentiating situations where 
bidders underestimate, overestimate or accurately estimate FP.  
We also check the impact of the ‘Price is Right’ procedure on the WTPs. As there is no additional 
external information given to subjects between Stage 1 and Stage 3, no economics standard hypothesis 
would support a change in WTP at this stage. However, the issue of price might have a psychological 
effect on a subject and modify his or her WTP. Therefore, apart from the documented effect on WTP 
of a mere repetition of an auction, a difference between WTPstand  and WTPrecon might be due to a 
saliency effect of the field price issue. WTPrecon is on average slightly superior to WTPstand (€1.17 vs €1.12) although the hyssop jelly is the only product that has a significant difference between WTPStand 
and WTPrecon (Wicoxon matched-pair test, p=0.0112; all the other products have p>0.05).  
 
B.  Values and Prices 
 Subjects do not properly estimate the field prices 
OBSERVATION 1: ΔestimFP≠0. Subjects do not properly estimate the field prices. The direction 
(whether subjects underestimate or overestimate the field price) and the extent of the estimation errors 
depend on the nature of the product.  
When applying a t-test to the 8 products, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that ΔestimFP is 
different from zero. Nevertheless, the rejection of this hypothesis only means that the subjects’ errors 
on the 8 products are centred on zero. In fact, only 3% of the individual estimations were strictly 
correct and 17% were correct within a 10% range. Looking at them product by product, 
overestimations do not compensate for underestimations (or inversely). While prices for both bananas 
and organic bags are underestimated on average, prices for smoothies, jellies, crisps and both types of 
baguette bread are overestimated
13. The magnitude of errors is also related to the nature of the product. 
New or unfamiliar products like smoothies, hyssop jelly or organic bags exhibit larger estimation 
errors (respectively -41.8%, -30.5% and +116.7%) than more commonly-used products like baguette 
bread (-0.6%), ‘balanced’ baguettes (-9.9%) and packets of crisps (-16.6%). Results for both types of 
banana are more surprising (+60.8% for the ‘normal’ bananas and +22.3% for the fair-trade bananas). 
 Subjects want a surplus 
OBSERVATION 2: SS>0 and OS>0. Subjects do not confuse values and prices. On the basis of their FP 
estimation or FP knowledge, they are looking for a good deal in the lab.  
For every product of our set, WTPstand is significantly lower than FPestim (Wilcoxon signed rank test, 
p=0.0000). On average, subjects are willing to pay €0.79 less than their field price estimation. At the 
individual level, 77% of the decisions display lower WTPstand than FPestim and 9.3% exhibit the same 
amount. We find similar results once the actual field price is announced: WTPFP is significantly lower 
than the FP (p=0.0000), with an average difference of €0.84. The proportion of WTPFP>FP is 
significantly lower than the proportion of WTPstand>FPestim (Fisher Exact, p=0.0189). Without price 
information, bidders are willing to pay less than what they think the price is. Once the field price is 
known, subjects are still willing to pay less than the price. Subjects are (objective or subjective) 
surplus seekers: they are not willing to pay as much for a product in the lab as they would have to pay 
outside the lab. These results support the Field Price Censoring of Harrison et al. (2004). This effect is 
strengthened by FP disclosure
14.  
Elasticity is on average positive and inferior to one 
                                                      
13 Differences between the estimation means and the relevant field prices are significant at the 5% level for the 
fair-trade bananas and at the 1% level for all the other products according to a t-test. 
14 Harrison et al. (2004), using the data of Hoffman et al. (1993), observe that WTPstand<FP. This is not always 
true here, even on average. Subjects may bid above the actual FP (the frequency of WTPstand>FP reaches 52.4% 
for bananas). The position of WTPstand relative to FP is dependent on the error of estimation their bidders have 
made. For instance, Hoffman et al. (1993)’s participants may have underestimated the field price of steaks 
whereas our participants have overestimated the field price of bananas.   OBSERVATION 3: 0 < Elast < 1. On average, subjects revise their willingness to pay with the same sign 
of their estimation error. This means that the average WTP decreases (increases) with the FP 
disclosure when FP has generally been overestimated (underestimated).  The magnitude of the WTP 
revision is smaller than the magnitude of the estimation error. Surprisingly, the elasticity does not 
happen to be larger when the FP is overestimated.  
The great majority of subjects revise their willingness to pay in the same direction as their error of 
estimation: ΔrevisWTP>0 when ΔestimFP>0 and ΔrevisWTP<0 when ΔestimFP<0. At the individual 
level, 53.7% of the WTPs are revised either downward when the field price is overestimated or upward 
when the field price is underestimated. Nonetheless, WTPs are revised in the opposite direction for 
20.8% of the revision decisions (Fisher exact p=0.0000). It is worth mentioning that for one quarter of 
the decisions, WTPstand is equal to WTPFP. The magnitude of WTP revisions is lower than the 
magnitude of error estimations: ΔrevisWTP<ΔestimFP. Among the cases of underestimations, WTPs 
increase in average by €0.21 when the estimations of the FP were in average €0.84 below the correct 
estimation. As for the cases of overestimations, WTPs decrease in average by €0.33 when the 
estimations of the FP were €1.31 above the actual FP. As may be expected, the average WTP revision 
is null among the subjects with accurate estimations of the FP. 
OBSERVATION 4: ΔrevisWTP is monotonic with ΔestimFP, and ΔrevisWTP seems to be roughly linear 
to ΔestimFP. In other words, the larger the error estimation, the greater the revision of the willingness 
to pay will be. 
In Figure 2 we categorize decisions in deciles according to the error estimations. The first decile 
contains the decisions with the largest overestimations and the 10
th decile contains the decisions with 
the largest underestimations. One can clearly see that ΔrevisWTP increase monotonically: the larger 
the overestimation (underestimation), the larger the decrease (increase) of the WTP will be. 
Furthermore, the elasticity is relatively stable over the deciles – apart from the 4
th one
15 – with the 
mean values (0.27, 0.12, 0.37, 0.30, 0.23, 0.26, 0.23, 0.26, 0.24). The median test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the Elasts of these deciles are identical (χ
2(8)=10.0959, p=0.258)
16,17. Similarly, when 
the field-price is overestimated, Elast is not significantly different from when FP is underestimated 
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney, p=0.4808).  
--- FIGURE 2 HERE--- 
A constant elasticity would mean a linear relationship between ΔrevisWTP and ΔestimFP. That is what 
we may look for in Table 2. The coefficient a, (i.e. Elast), is equal to 0.26 and is highly significant. 
The intercept is null. The scatter plot of the regression is displayed in Figure 3. 
--- FIGURE 3 HERE --- 
--- TABLE 3 HERE --- 
OBSERVATION 5: Individually, the subjective surplus (SS) is not systematically larger or equal to the 
objective surplus (OS). 
                                                      
15 In the 4
th decile, Elast = -2.58. This is essentially due to the very small denominator of Elast as this decile 
comprises all the estimation errors that are equal or very close to zero. This makes the elasticity highly volatile 
as even small changes in WTPs have a big impact on its value. 
16 If we include Elast of the 4
th decile, the median test cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level: 
χ
2(9)=14.8606, p=0.095. 
17 The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sample test corroborates the median test. We applied the 45 tests 
(including Elast of the fourth decile) and did not find any significant result at the 5% level.  We saw above in Section 1 (indicator 6) that OS – SS = ΔestimFP (1 – Elast). This means that OS > SS 
when ΔestimFP>0 (underestimation of the actual field-price) and OS < SS when ΔestimFP<0 
(overestimation of the FP). This is largely confirmed by the data: for example, only 25.6% of the 
decisions have SS > OS when FP is overestimated and only 11.3% have SS < OS when FP is 
underestimated (i.e. Elast>1). The rationale is simple. With 0 < Elast < 1, WTP’s adjustments do not 
entirely match the estimation errors. Consequently, surplus increases from Stage 1 (SS) to Stage 3 
(OS) when ΔestimFP is positive and decreases when ΔestimFP is negative. 
 
C.  Assessment of our four hypotheses 
H1 Stable and independent WTP – FP has no impact on bids in only one quarter of all cases (see the 
first row of Table 4). Unsurprisingly, bidders are sensitive to the price disclosure. The idealistic 
situation where the laboratory is able to elicit private valuation independently from the field (H1) is 
clearly not verified. 
--- TABLE 4 HERE --- 
H2 Price Cap WTP – Although frictions confuse the clear predictions of Section 3, one can still state 
than bidders with high PV (small surplus) should be more elastic than bidders with low PV (large 
surplus). Table 5 shows medians of Elast depending on whether SS and OS are below or above 0.25
18. 
Elasticity is significantly higher for bidders with SS≤0.25 than for bidders with SS>0.25 (medians of 
0.25 vs. 0.00, p=0.0228 with a Wilcoxon ranksum test). That is, bidders who are bidding up to what 
they perceive to be the field price change their bid when they realize that their field price expectations 
were wrong. They do so to a greater extent than bidders who bid below their expectation of FP. 
Similarly, elasticity is significantly higher for bidders with OS≤0.25 than for bidders with OS>0.25 
(0.33 vs. 0.00, p=0.0001): bidders with high PV are paying more attention to the opportunity to buy 
outside the lab. We also find significant difference when one combines low SS and OS compared to 
high SS and OS: 0.50 vs. 0.00, p=0.0000). If aggregate results validate H2, the large dispersion in 
individual data (Table 4) calls for caution. 
--- TABLE 5 HERE --- 
H3 Arbitrage WTP – Bidders do not systematically offer the field price or what they perceive to be the 
field price (Elast≠1). Even when we take into account risk aversion and commitment costs, we do not 
find that SS is systematically larger than the objective surplus OS. Bidders do not seek higher 
surpluses in riskier situations (uncertainty about the true value of FP) or in situations with higher 
commitment costs. This would have been the case if subjects had considered the products only for 
their exchange value, with both doubts about their valuation of the FP and risk aversion. This is 
clearly not the case and we may therefore conclude that subjects consider the products offered in the 
lab at least partially for their use value. 
H4 Price Signal and unstable WTP – The field price acts here as a quality signal and therefore 
performs as an attractor to the PV (Elast>0). That would be the case in 53.7% of the experimental 
situations. One can imagine that the price has different degrees of influence, depending on the 
individual, and that there are individuals for whom prices of some products do not signal quality 
(25.5%). However, H4 can hardly explain the 20.8% of situations where Elast<0. Furthermore, it is 
                                                      
18 The threshold of 0.25 has been chosen arbitrarily in order to obtain samples that are comparable in size. 
Conclusions remain robust with a threshold of 0. intuitive to assume that the price signal will signal more when the product is unknown than when it is 
common. This is not verified by our data as we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference of 
Elast between the hyssop jelly and the baguette (p=0.5934, Wilcoxon ranksum test). 
 
5.  DISCUSSION AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAB  
 
Our results clearly show that FP influences WTP. First, bidders revise their bid when they learn about 
FP and, second, the extent of the revision depends on the distance between FP and what bidders 
expected it to be. (We show that the elasticity of the WTP revision according to the estimation error is 
significant and positive, and can be roughly approximate to one quarter of the error). The impact of FP 
on WTP affects the interpretation of the data when the experiment aims at eliciting private valuations. 
FP should not impact PV if bidders value a good only for their private consumption (H1). Conversely, 
FP generates a common value if bidders carry out an arbitrage operation on the goods auctioned (H3). 
While PVs are perfectly elicited in the lab in H1, bids elicit common value only in H3. Neither of the 
hypotheses have been verified in our data and the truth may well lie between these two extreme 
situations: PV is either unstable (H4) or partially veiled behind the common value (H2). Clear 
discrimination between the two proposals comes across market frictions: the extent of commitment 
costs and transaction costs blurs the actual position of PV relative to FP. The individual identification 
of these costs would help to validate H2. If not, H4 would be an alternative. 
What are the normative implications of our results in terms of protocol design?   
The easiest way to confine subjects to their private value (then H1 or H4), by limiting reference to 
common value (and then excluding H2 and H3), is to design a protocol where they are informed that, if 
they buy a product, it will be compulsory for them to consume it. This is strictly controlled when the 
protocol includes an ‘in the lab’ immediate and compulsory consumption of all products bought during 
a session. Unfortunately, while it is easy to implement such a procedure for some food products – a 
sandwich or a coffee –, it is obviously impossible to do so for many others. Note two other limits of 
such a design. First, having to consume it immediately in the lab may dramatically alter the use value 
of a product, even if its consumption is technically possible. One would greatly value a beer consumed 
at home in the evening after the session, but attach very little value to the same beer drunk quickly in 
the lab before leaving a session. Second, the price posted outside may act as such: “I can have the 
same beer within 10 minutes if I buy it at the market price from the corner shop”. Immediate 
consumption is a (relatively) efficient way to control and avoid the elicitation of common value rather 
than private value in the lab.  
When, for any reason, products cannot be consumed immediately in the lab, common value elicitation 
cannot be eliminated.  As we have seen, a major source of poor control of common value lies outside 
the lab transaction costs. Therefore, if one cannot eliminate them, a proper design will try to control 
these costs. A good way to do so is to introduce an announced “field price posted market” in the lab at 
the end of sessions. To control and objectify the price cap in H2, the protocol should simply guarantee 
that products bought during the auctions will be bought back on request by the experimentalist at the 
end of the session. When additionally the posted price is given to the subjects, then the price cap is 
totally under control: rational bids cannot exceed this single, obvious and common knowledge cap. If 
ignored, then a belief exploration of the subjective posted price is required, but control is then 
loosened by risk aversion.  In addition of the previously described end-of-session ‘buy back posted market at field price’, the 
experimentalist may implement a ‘selling posted market at (the same) field price’. With such a design, 
we guarantee and control H3 (arbitrage) without transaction costs, and without possible arbitration, as 
it needs price discrimination. In such a context, any product in the lab, whatever it is, is transformed 
into a (certain) financial product, therefore with no common value. If the field price is given to the 
subjects, all rational bids should be at this field price. (Note that this design is Vernon Smith 
redemption value equivalent.) 
What sort of protocol would stress H1 against H2? We justify H4 on the basis of the field price used by 
subjects as a signal of quality. Therefore, the more information is given to subjects about products, the 
less the signal is necessary. Suppose we sell Bordeaux wine in the lab on the sole basis of blind 
testing. A non-expert consumer would learn a lot about the quality of a wine if given its field price 
(that may currently vary from 5€ to 500€) even if he or she focused only on the private value. This 
price might significantly influence a reasonable consumer’s WTP. If less information is supplied 
concerning the attributes of products delivered in the lab than those (believed) to be available in the 
field, uncontrolled commitment costs are rational and must be taken into account in interpreting the 
results. A particular attribute, generally neglected in the literature but that might have a significant 
effect because it obviously links field price and WTP, is production costs. We know that WTP for fruit 
and vegetables is often low because a significant proportion of consumers believe that the cost is null 
(or just equal to the picking costs). On the contrary, one may over-evaluate the cost of a night in a 5-
star hotel because of the extreme luxury in the lobby, without taking into account the fact that this cost 
is divided by the 800 rooms of the palace, rented 365 days a year. With a (believed) competitive 
market, field prices strictly reflect cost and might influence WTP, especially for a single purchase (the 
consumer will then adjust his or her demand in relation to the quantities). 
  
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
We show in this paper that field prices influence willingness to pay in the lab. We have good reasons 
to believe that field prices also influence willingness to pay in the field. Therefore, experiments aimed 
at measuring WTP in the lab should pay particular attention to this price variable for the sake of 
parallelism and realism.  
Experimental economics builds its scientific reputation on its excellent ability to control economic 
environments and to isolate and therefore measure variables. Our first result is that field prices do 
indeed influence WTP in the lab, whether they are revealed or not (in the latter case the influence is 
through beliefs). We analyze the reasons for such an influence with two types of reason. The first type 
of reason results from common value considerations. A subject who has the opportunity to buy a good 
in the lab may question the price at which he can buy (or resell) the same product in the field. He may 
also question the amount of the transaction costs that such a deal would generate. We propose new 
designs: (i) to control (eliminate) the induced transaction costs, and (ii) to control (reveal) the field 
price. These new designs will help to separate subjects’ private and common valuations. The second 
type of reason for linking WTP and field price results from private value considerations. Here price is 
taken as a quality (or cost) signal. This is rational when markets are competitive, individual 
preferences are close to average ones, and product attributes are partially ignored. In such a context, 
field prices may be rationally taken as a privately valuable attribute. We propose to take this rationale 
into account in the design of experiments. First, we increase control and parallelism by delivering the field price to the subjects before auctioning a product. Second, when it is neither possible nor desirable 
to reveal field prices, the control is increased if subjects’ field price beliefs are collected in parallel 
with their WTP. 
 References 
 
Becker, G.M., DeGroot, M.H., and Marschak, J. (1964) “Measuring Utility by a Single-Response 
Sequential Method.” Behavioral Science. 9, 226-232. 
 
Brookshire, D.S., Coursey, D.L., and Schulze, W.D. (1987) “The External Validity of Experimental 
Economics Techniques: Analysis of Demand Behavior.” Economic Inquiry. 25 (2), 239-250. 
 
Buzby, J.C., Fox, J.A., Ready, R.C., and Crutchfield, S.R. (1998) “Measuring Consumer Benefits of 
Food Safety Risk Reductions.” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics. 30(1), 69–82. 
 
Carlsson, F.  Frykblom, P., Lagerkvist C.J. (2007) “Preferences with and without prices - does the 
price attribute affect behavior in stated preference surveys?” Environmental and Resource Economics. 
38, 155-164. 
 
Cason, T.N., Friedman, D., and Milam, G.H. (2003) “Bargaining versus posted price competition in 
customer markets.” International Journal of Industrial Organization. 21 (2), 223-251. 
 
Cherry, T.L., Frykblom, P., Shogren, J.F., List, J.A., Sullivan, M.B. (2004) “Laboratory Testbeds and 
Non-Market Valuation: The Case of Bidding Behavior in a Second-Price Auction with an Outside 
Option.” Environmental & Resource Economics. 29, 285–294. 
 
Corrigan, J.R., and, Rousu, M.C. (2006) “Posted Prices and Bid Affiliation: Evidence from 
Experimental Auctions.” American  Journal of  Agricultural Economics, 88(4), 1078–1090. 
 
Cummings, R.G., Elliot, S., Harrison, G.W., and Rutstrom, E.E. (1995) “Homegrown Values and 
Hypothetical Surveys: Is the Dichotomous Choice Approach Incentive-Compatible?” The American 
Economic Review, 85(1), 260-266. 
 
Drichoutis, A.C., Lazaridis, P., and Nayga Jr., R.M. (2008) “The role of reference prices in 
experimental auctions.” Economics Letters.  99, 446-448. 
 
Fox, J.A. (1995) “Determinants of Consumer Acceptability of Bovine Somatotropin.” Review of 
Agricultural Economics. 17, 51–62. 
 
Harrison, G.W., Harstad, R.M., Rutström, E.E. (2004) “Experimental methods and elicitation of 
values.” Experimental Economics. 7, 123-140. 
 
Hayes, D.J., Shogren, J.F., Shin, S.U., and Kliebenstein, J.B. (1995) “Valuing Food Safety in 
Experimental 
Auction Markets.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 77, 40–53. 
 
Hoffman, E., Menkhaus, D.J., Chakravarti, D., Field, R.A., and Whipple, G.D. (1993) “Using 
Laboratory Experimental Auctions in Marketing Research: A Case Study of New Packaging for Fresh 
Beef.” Marketing Science. 12(3), 318-338. 
 
Issanchou, S., Ginon, E., Combris, P. (2008) “How preferences drive consumers’ behaviour?” 
Conference: Analyse des choix alimentaires et méthodes expérimentales, Pôle de l’Alimentation 
Parisien. 
 
Krishna, V. (2010) Auction Theory. Academic Press. 
 
List, J. (2003) “Using Random nth Price Auctions to Value Non-Market Goods and Services.” Journal 
of Regulatory Economics, 23(2), 193–205.   
List, J., and Shogren, J. (1998) “Experimental Calibration of the Difference Between Actual and 
Hypothetical Reported Valuations,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 37(2), 193-205. 
 
Lusk, J.L., Daniel, M.S., Mark, D.R., and Lusk, C.L. (2001) “Alternative Calibration and Auction 
Institutions for Predicting Consumer Willingness to Pay for Nongenetically Modified Corn Chips.” 
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics. 26(1), 40–57. 
 
Lusk, J.L., and Norwood, F.B. (2008) “A Calibrated Auction-Conjoint Valuation Method:  
Valuing Pork and Eggs Produced under Differing Animal Welfare Conditions.” Working Paper.  
 
Lusk J.L., and Shogren, J.F. (2007) Experimental Auctions, Methods and applications in Economic 
and Marketing Research, Quantative methods for applied economics and business research series. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Noussair, C., Robin, S., and Ruffieux, B. (2004a) “Do consumers really refuse to buy genetically 
modified food?” Economic Journal. 114, 102-120. 
 
Noussair, C., Robin, S., and Ruffieux, B. (2004b) “Revealing consumers' willingness-to-pay: A 
comparison of the BDM mechanism and the Vickrey auction.” Journal of Economic Psychology. 
25(6), 725-741. 
 
Neill, H.R., Cummings, R.G., Ganderton, P.T., Harrison, G.W., and McGuckin, T. (1994). 
“Hypothetical Surveys and Real Economic Commitments.” Land Economics. 70(2), 145–154. 
 
Roosen, J., Fox, J.A., Hennessy, D.A., and Schreiber, A. (1998) “Consumers’ Valuation of Insecticide 
Use Restrictions: An Application to Apples.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics. 23(2), 
367–384. 
 
Rousu, M.C., and Corrigan, J.R. (2008) “Estimating the Welfare Loss to Consumers When Food 
Labels Do Not Adequately Inform: An Application to Fair Trade Certification.” Journal of 
Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization. 6(1). 
 
Smith, V. (1976) “Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory.” The American Economic 
Review. 66 (2), 274-279. 
 
Vickrey, W. (1961) “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders.” Journal of 
Finance. 16, 8-37. 
 
Wertenbroch, K., and Skiera, B. (2002) “Measuring Consumers’ Willingness to Pay at the Point of 
Purchase.” Journal of Marketing Research. 39, 228–41. 
 
Zhao, J., Kling, C. (2004) “Willingness to pay, compensating variation, and the cost of commitment.” 
Economic Inquiry. 42, 503-517.   
Tables and figures  
 
Table 1: The experimental design: stages, procedures and variables 
Stage  Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3  Stage 4  Stage 5 
Used Procedure   Vickrey 
Auction  
4th Price 

































Table 2: Summary Statistics 
  n  FPestim FP  WTPstand WTPFP ΔFPestim  ΔWTPrevis
Smoothie  124  1.57 € 2.70 € 1.04 €  1.33 €  +1.13 €  +0.29 € 
Banana  124  1.59 € 0.99 € 1.03 €  0.71 €  -0.60 €  -0.31 € 
Fair-Trade Banana  124  2.24 € 1.99 € 1.46 €  1.31 €  -0.25 €  -0.15 € 
Hyssop Jelly  124  3.75 € 5.40 € 2.21 €  2.75 €  +1.65 €  +0.54 € 
Baguette  124  0.90 € 1.00 € 0.77 €  0.80 €  +0.10 €  +0.03 € 
Organic Bag  124  3.25 € 1.50 € 1.27 €  0.90 €  -1.75 €  -0.37 € 
Crisps  124  1.08 € 1.29 € 0.59 €  0.68 €  +0.21 €  +0.09 € 





All Products  992  1.90 € 1.98 € 1.12 €  1.14 €  +0.07 €  +0.02 € 
Smoothie  10  3.24 € 2.70 € 1.84 €  1.97 €  -0.54 €  + 0.13 € 
Banana  96  1.82 € 0.99 € 1.15 €  0.74 €  -0.83 €  -0.40 € 
Fair-Trade Banana  58  3.12 € 1.99 € 2.00 €  1.49 €  -1.13 €  -0.51 € 
Hyssop Jelly  16  7.10 € 5.40 € 4.02 €  4.27 €  -1.70 €  +0.25 € 
Baguette  22  1.27 € 1.00 € 1.16 €  1.08 €  -0.27 €  -0.08 € 
















Crisps  28  1.87 € 1.29 € 0.78 €  0.76 €  -0.58 €  -0.02 € Balanced Baguette  30  1.18 € 0.95 € 0.82 €  0.79 €  -0.23 €  -0.04 € 
All Products  342  2.87 € 1.56 € 1.49 €  1.16 €  -1.31 €  -0.33 € 
Smoothie  1  2.70 € 2.70 € 1.07 €  1.05 €  0.00 €  -0.02 € 
Banana  5  0.99 € 0.99 € 0.60 €  0.56 €  0.00 €  -0.04 € 
Fair-Trade Banana  0  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Hyssop Jelly  2  5.40 € 5.40 € 4.73 €  4.95 €  0.00 €  +0.23 € 
Baguette  7  1.00 € 1.00 € 1.01 €  0.83 €  0.00 €  -0.19 € 
Organic Bag  8  1.50 € 1.50 € 0.50 €  0.64 €  0.00 €  +0.14 € 
Crisps  1  1.29 € 1.29 € 0.00 €  0.00 €  0.00 €  0.00 € 

















All Products  30  1.48 € 1.48 € 0.93 €  0.93 €  0.00 €  -0.01 € 
Smoothie  113  1.41 € 2.70 € 0.97 €  1.27 €  +1.29 €  +0.31 € 
Banana  23  0.76 € 0.99 € 0.62 €  0.63 €  +0.23 €  +0.01 € 
Fair-Trade Banana  66  1.46 € 1.99 € 0.99 €  1.16 €  +0.53 €  +0.17 € 
Hyssop Jelly  106  3.21 € 5.40 € 1.89 €  2.49 €  +2.19 €  +0.59 € 
Baguette  95  0.81 € 1.00 € 0.67 €  0.74 €  +0.19 €  +0.07 € 
Organic Bag  34  0.80 € 1.50 € 0.72 €  0.72 €  +0.70 €  0.00 € 
Crisps  95  0.84 € 1.29 € 0.55 €  0.67 €  +0.45 €  +0.12 € 

















All Products  620  1.39 € 2.23 € 0.92 €  1.14 €  +0.84 €  +0.21 € 
 
 
Table 3: Linear approximation to Estimation Errors  
ΔrevisWTP  Coefficient  Standard Error  t  p > |t| 
ΔestimFP  0.2639
***  0.0180  14.69  0.000 
(ΔestimFP)
2  -0.0063  0.0043  -1.47  0.142 
(ΔestimFP)
3  -0.0002  0.0002  -1.11  0.266 
Intercept  0.0258  0.0266  0.97  0.332 
R
2  0.1959 
 
  
Table 4: Frequency of situations according the value of Elast 
Frequency  Elast < 0  Elast = 0  0 < Elast < 1 Elast = 1  Elast > 1 
Overall  200 (20.8%)  245 (25.5%)  340 (35.3%)  20 (2.1%)  157 (16.3%) 
SS≤0.25  109 (25%)  66 (15%)  166 (38%)  17 (4%)  83 (19%) 
SS>0.25  91 (17%)  179 (34%)  174 (33%)  3 (1%)  74 (14%) 
OS≤0.25  80 (23%)  50 (14%)  130 (37%)  17 (5%)  78 (22%) 
OS>0.25  120 (20%)  195 (32%)  210 (35%)  3 (0%)  79 (13%) 
SS≤0.25 & OS>0.25  67 (34%)  26 (13%)  78 (40%)  0 (0%)  26 (13%) 
SS>0.25 & OS≤0.25  38 (34%)  10 (9%)  42 (38%)  0 (0%)  21 (19%) 
SS,OS≤0.25  42 (17%)  40 (16%)  88 (36%)  17 (7%)  57 (23%) 
SS,OS>0.25  53 (41%)  169 (41%)  132 (32%)  3 (1%)  53 (13%) 
 
Table 5: Median of Elast according the value of SS and OS 
Median of Elast 
(number of observations)
OS≤0.25  OS>0.25  All OS 
SS≤0.25  0.50 (244) 0.09 (197) 0.25 (441) 
SS>0.25  0.16 (111) 0.00 (410) 0.00 (521) 
All SS  0.33 (355) 0.00 (607) 0.11 (962) 
  



















































































































   